In this paper, the authors examine the political economy drivers of the variation in agricultural protection, both across countries and within countries over time. The paper starts by listing the key insights provided by both the theoretical and empirical literature on the political economy of trade policy formulation. The authors then set out a basic framework that allows us to put forth various testable hypotheses on the variation and evolution of agricultural protection.

This paper analyzes the political and institutional factors which are behind the dramatic changes in distortions to agricultural incentives in the transition countries in East Asia, Central Asia, and the rest of the former Soviet Union, and in Central and Eastern Europe. The paper explains why these changes have occurred and why there are large differences among transition countries in the extent and the nature of the remaining distortions.

Britain contrary to received wisdom was not a free trader for most of the 1800s and, despite repeal of the Corn Laws, continued to have higher tariffs than the French until the last quarter of the century. War with Louis fourteenth from 1689 led to the end of all trade between Britain and France for a quarter of a century. The creation of powerful protected interests both at home and abroad led to the imposition of prohibitively high tariffs on French imports notably on wine and spirits, when trade with France resumed in 1714.

This paper uses new data on agricultural policy interventions to examine the political economy of agricultural trade policies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Historically, African governments have discriminated against agricultural producers in general (relative to producers in non-agricultural sectors), and against producers of export agriculture in particular. While more moderate in recent years, these patterns of discrimination persist. They do so even though farmers comprise a political majority.

This paper describes agricultural policy choices and tests some predictions of political economy theories. It begins with three broad stylized facts: governments tend to tax agriculture in poorer countries, and subsidize it in richer ones, tax both imports and exports more than nontradables and tax more and subsidize less where there is more land per capita.

This paper empirically explores the political-economic determinants of why governments choose to tax or subsidize trade in agriculture. The authors use a new data set on nominal rates of assistance (NRA) across a number of commodities spanning the last five decades for 64 countries. NRAs measure the effect on domestic (relative to world) price of the quantitative and price-based instruments used to regulate agricultural markets. The data set admits consideration of both taxes and subsidies on exports and imports.

The Greenhouse Gases from Agriculture Simulation Model (GreenAgSiM) presented in this paper aims to quantify emissions from agricultural activity on a global scale. The model takes emissions into account that are directly attributable to agricultural production, such as enteric fermentation (methane), manure management (methane and nitrous oxide), and agricultural soil management (nitrous oxide). Furthermore, carbon stock differences from land-use change (carbon dioxide) induced by agriculture are included in the model.

Este informe de políticas se propone informar a los negociadores en dónde se sitúa la agricultura en el marco de las negociaciones actuales y proporciona algunas propuestas sobre cómo ésta podría abordarse en un acuerdo mundial sobre el cambio climático. El informe se basa en la presentación más técnica y exhaustiva acover_page por la FAO al Grupo de Trabajo Especial sobre la Cooperación a Largo Plazo (AWG-LCA), antes de su Cuarta Sesión (FAO, Enabling agriculture to contribute to climate change mitigation, 6 de febrero de 2009).

 
Lo agropolitano: vision desde España
Jaime Izquierdo Vallina*

El endosulfán fue propuesto por la Unión Europea para que se incluyera en el Convenio de Estocolmo sobre Contaminantes Orgánicos Persistentes, debido a que es tóxico, persistente, bioacumulable y puede desplazarse a grandes distancias. El Secretariado del Convenio y el Comité de Revisión de Nuevos COPs aceptó la nominación, con la finalidad de que se elabore un perfil de riesgo y un plan de manejo con recomendaciones para ser aprobadas por la Conferencia de las Partes de dicho Convenio para su posible eliminación a nivel mundial.