Pasar al contenido principal

page search

Biblioteca How Institutions Shape Land Deals: The Role of Corruption

How Institutions Shape Land Deals: The Role of Corruption

How Institutions Shape Land Deals: The Role of Corruption

Resource information

Date of publication
Febrero 2015
Resource Language
ISBN / Resource ID
OSF_preprint:46168-4A4-413

Large-scale land acquisitions often take place in developing countries which are also known for their corruption-friendliness caused by weak institutional frameworks. We hypothesize that corruption indeed leads to more land deals. We argue that corrupt elites exploit poor institutional setups (characterized by corruption) to strike deals with domestic and international investors at the expense of the local population. Using panel data for 156 countries from 2000-2011, we provide evidence that large-scale land deals indeed occur more often in countries with higher levels of corruption. The estimated effects are also economically substantive and particularly relevant to economies with unsound institutions. large-scale land acquisitions, land grabbing, foreign investments, weak institutions, corruption

Share on RLBI navigator
NO

Authors and Publishers

Author(s), editor(s), contributor(s)

Matthias Bujko
Daniel Meierrieks
Tim Krieger
Christian Fischer

Data Provider
Geographical focus