Zambia - Context and Land Governance

Although the bulk of land in Zambia remains under systems of customary tenure, there have been significant shifts in the amount of land that has been converted to enable privatisation through statutory leasehold title. However, the extent of these conversions has yet to be reliably quantified.  With the increasing demand for land, the need for accurate land data and tensions over unplanned urbanisation feature prominently on Zambia’s land governance agenda. 

The country is landlocked, sharing borders with eight countries: Angola, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, the DRC, Malawi, Tanzania and Mozambique. Zambia is an ethnically diverse country – a product of complex histories of migration and colonial era border demarcation. English is the official language of government business. 

The majority of the country lies within the Zambezi River basin. It has a surface area of 752,614 sq. km of which of which 11,890 sq. km is water area. The country has three main agro-ecological regions.

^{The three agro-ecological regions in Zamabia. Source: Soil Survey, Mt. Makulu Chilanga}

Some 42 million ha receives annual rainfall of between 800-1400mm and is suitable for agriculture¹. Soil quality is poor across two of the three agro-ecological regions. Much of the land in rural areas is relatively thinly populated. According to the Government of Zambia 14% of agricultural land is being utilised in Zambia².

Historical backdrop

The territories making up modern day Zambia were first appropriated by the British South Africa Company (BSAC), which obtained a ‘royal charter’ in 1889 with a duration of 25 years. The charter, issued within the context of British imperialist ambitions, gave the company monopoly power to acquire, administer and profit from territories under its control³. The BSAC ceded these governance powers back to the British colonial office in 1924. 

The construction of the railway from Victoria Falls to present day Kabwe, and on to the Northern boundary of the colony became the magnet for land acquisition and settler occupation.  Agricultural and mineral rich land along the line of rail were designated as Crown Land and reserved for Europeans. Some 60,000 people living on this land were removed to adjacent ‘native reserves’ demarcated by the colonial authorities, where soils were of poorer quality, impacting on household food security⁴. In total 39 reserves were established in 1929, which also “facilitated governance through Native Authorities (chiefs) and tax collection for the colonial regime”⁵.

^{Weeding maize, Mongu Western Zambia Photo by Felix Clay (CC-BY-NC-ND 2.0 license).}

At the same time much of the Crown land designated for white people, who constituted less than 2% of the population, remained unoccupied. In 1947 the colonial authorities demarcated additional Trust lands amounting to some 57% of the total land area, for “the use or common benefit, direct or indirect of the “Natives”⁶. 

Zambia obtained independence in 1964. This transition was peaceful, following a campaign of civil disobedience by Zambian nationalists. Elsewhere in the region the transition to majority rule was fiercely contested by white minority interests. Zambia played an active role for three decades following its independence, to support the decolonisation struggles in Southern Africa, including those of Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. This had far reaching political, economic and social consequences for the country. It contributed to the move to increasingly centralised and authoritarian governance⁷ when Zambia revised its Constitution to become a one-party state in 1972. It also saw a major Chinese investment in the construction of the TAZARA rail line (1970-1976) to Dar Es Salaam to offset Zambia’s dependence on South African ports. This major infrastructure project prefigured subsequent Chinese investments in agriculture, mining and infrastructure⁸.

Throughout its post-colonial history Zambia has had a strong dependence on revenues derived from mining. At independence, the country’s copper resources were the main source of foreign exchange and formal sector employment. Five years after independence the Zambian government nationalised the copper mines, seeking to reclaim control from foreign multinationals⁹. However the timing of this move coincided with a world-wide recession in the 1970’s, linked to the global oil price spike in 1973. This precipitated a collapse in the price of copper, which fell by half in 1975. This had a major impact on the Zambian economy. In a thirty-year period 1969-1999 copper output fell from 720,000 tons to 286,000 tons. 

^{Mopani Coppermine East Vecor Mill. Photo by PhotoSmith2011 (CC-BY-SA 2.0 license)}

The nationalised mines fell deeply in debt, as did the country as a whole. By 1985 Zambia was one of the most globally indebted countries. It was forced to borrow from the IMF, which imposed a structural adjustment programme in 1986 as a loan conditionality. This removed subsidies on the price of basic foodstuffs, triggering food riots, which led to Zambia’s break with the IMF in 1987. 

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 redrew global geopolitics driving a worldwide shift towards multiparty forms of governance. This put pressure on the United National Independence Party (UNIP), which had ruled Zambia continuously since independence, to draw up a new Constitution and hold democratic elections. In 1991, the new Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) convincingly defeated UNIP, coming to power on a policy platform advocating far-reaching economic liberalisation. The new government sought to incentivise both local and foreign investment in mining, agriculture, and tourism.

Economic liberalisation came with renewed relations with the IMF and a revised structural adjustment package, as Zambia embarked on a rapid privatisation programme. This set out to remove controls on agricultural prices, privatise 280 state owned enterprises and put in place a raft of related economic policy measures. A new focus was placed on agricultural modernisation for market driven growth and the attraction of foreign investment¹⁰. Around 72,000 people are estimated to have lost their jobs as a result of privatisation. Rapid privatisation created opportunities for elite capture of state assets, as “the privatization of state-owned companies was mishandled with millions of dollars still unaccounted for”¹¹.

Despite the structural adjustment programme, Zambia continued to experience negative economic growth between 1991 and 1995, and by 1998 real GDP had contracted by 2%. Zambia’s external debt in 2001 stood at 181% of gross national product¹². This was also exacerbated by very high rates of HIV infection. Currently Zambia ranks 7th out of the global top ten of countries most affected by HIV/AIDS with 1.3 million Zambians living with the virus. 

Zambia experienced a political crisis in the early 2000’s as then President Frederick Chiluba sought a third term in office. Levy Mwanawasa, the third President of Zambia who was sworn in in 2002, revoked Chiluba’s immunity from prosecution and he was charged with corruption in 2003, only to be cleared in 2009 after a six-year trial. Of the six presidents who succeeded Chiluba, two died while in office. While there has been intense political contestation this has never degenerated into open conflict.

The MMD retained power for a twenty-year period between 1991 – 2011. The Patriotic Front became the ruling party between 2011 -2021, before being replaced by the United Party for National Development and the current President Hakainde Hichilema in 2021. Zambia remains with a high debt burden with total public debt stock standing at 89% of GDP in 2020¹³.

Land legislation and regulations

Immediately after independence, the focus of the UNIP government was on repossessing land held by absentee landlords by means of the Lands Acquisition Act of 1970. The Land (Conversion of Titles) Act of 1975 introduced a land nationalisation programme, vesting all land in Zambia in the President, to be held by him in perpetuity for and on behalf of the people of Zambia¹⁴. Freehold  tenure was substituted with renewable statutory leaseholds for a maximum period of 99 years, effective from 1st July 1975¹⁵. This Act was amended in 1985 to enable non-Zambians to acquire access to land through grants or purchase of leasehold title, provided they had state sanction. 

The MMD introduced a Lands Bill in 1993, which sought to develop a land market and accelerate the privatisation of land. 

^{Chiefs play a central role in land administration in customary areas. Photo by CIF Action (CC-BY-NC-ND license)}

The Bill became law in the form of the 1995 Lands Act which merged Reserve and Trust Land into the Customary area. The Act established a Lands Tribunal to settle land disputes and made provision for a Land Development Fund to coordinate funding for land development projects. 

The Act retained several elements of past policy. It continued to reserve the ownership of all land in Zambia to the state. However, it confirmed legal recognition of customary tenure, guaranteeing that all customary land vested in individuals and households prior to the promulgation of the 1995 Lands Act would remain held under this system. The distinction between Customary land and State land, as defined in the Constitution and 1995 Land Law has not been changed since. The three practical distinguishing factors between state and customary land relate to markets, ownership and planning authority¹⁶. In terms of the 1962 Town and Country Planning Act planning authorities only had jurisdiction over state land¹⁷. The 2015 Urban and Regional Planning Act revoked this to provide planning authority over all land in Zambia, although in practice this has yet to be realised.

^{Distribution of customary land sales presents a highly differentiated picture. Source IAPRI/CSO/MAL 2021 in Honig and Mulenga 2015 p. 5}

Land conversion processes, irrespective of the relative formality or informality of the transactions, have raised persistent concerns about the effectiveness of the legal protection of those exercising customary rights on land designated for alienation¹⁸. Land rights holders are required to be consulted and to assent to any proposed conversion of land which impacts on their land rights.

There is evidence to suggest that the conversion processes enabled by the 1995 Land Act have created opportunities for certain Chiefs to act concert with local councils and corrupt officials to convert customary land and secure personal gain. Corruption related to land allocation and planning is regarded as being widespread¹⁹. Overall social division over these provisions of the Act is reported to have made it difficult for government to proceed with implementation and stimulated calls for a land policy review²⁰.

In 2000 the Ministry of Lands drafted a revised land policy.  As part of the policy review process the Zambia Land Alliance – a consortium of civil society organisations sought to “facilitate popular participation and advocacy on the land policy reforms”²¹. The policy was launched on the 11 May 2021 following drafting, consultation and validation attempts spanning two decades. However, the final condensed policy²² is much shorter on detail than previous drafts which has attracted criticism from some land sector NGOs²³.

Very different stories are told about land classification and the relative proportion of state and customary land. This reflects the inadequacy of land data to properly inform this picture.

Since the promulgation of the 1995 Lands Act which enabled customary land to be converted to state leasehold “a significant, but unknown, portion of customary land has been converted to statutory tenure both by individuals and the state”²⁴. According to one study referencing the relative proportions of state and customary land at Independence, state land comprised 4.5 million ha or 6% of the landmass, while customary land accounted for the remainder (93.9%). This was made up of reserve land amounting to 27,2 million ha or 36.2% of the total and Trust Land accounting for 43,3 million ha, or 57,7% of the total²⁵.  

^{The distribution of state and customary land in Zambia at independence 26.}

In 2013 the Minister of Lands released a statement reporting that, “my office is overwhelmed with cases of Zambians who are complaining of being displaced from their ancestral and family lands in preference for investors and the urban elite …”²⁷.

While noting the above statement, it needs to be recognised that both the Ministry of Land and the District Council must formally authorise any land conversion. Conversion processes are supposed to ensure that those whose land rights have been affected have been consulted and consent to the transfer. Larger scale land conversions require the signature of the Minister or the President. While such institutional protections may be in place, in practice their implementation may fall short, or be co-opted by powerful individuals and networks. 

A 2015 study argued that over time the percentage of customary land had fallen by 34% from 94% at independence to 60%. The study highlighted how “as active land markets in customary land encroach on traditional systems of land management, smallholder farmer populations have been pushed off ancestral land”. The study also noted that: 

“As the percentage of customary land has reduced, the absolute number of small-scale farmers has vastly increased. Eighty-nine percent of Zambia’s smallscale farmers derive access to their land through customary property rights.”²⁸

A more recent report estimates the percentage of customary land at 80% of the total²⁹. However, given that Zambia does not maintain a registry of customary land³⁰, it remains difficult to establish an accurate picture of land holdings across the country. Generally, there remain concerns about the accuracy and availability of land data in Zambia and the quality of record-keeping in the Land and Deeds Registry. 

In 2013 the Minister of Lands released a statement reporting that, “my office is overwhelmed with cases of Zambians who are complaining of being displaced from their ancestral and family lands in preference for investors and the urban elite …”

Land tenure classifications

As noted above, Zambia has a dual tenure system in which land is designated as either customary or state land. 

A 2017 draft of the National Land Policy identified different types of occupancy rights, licenses and state registered leases including: 

• a 10-year renewable Land Record Card is issued on Municipal land; 
• a 14-year interim lease based on a sketch pending a registered boundary survey; 
• a 30-year Land Occupancy License in municipal areas and settlement schemes³¹. 
• Otherwise, a 99-year leasehold period is typical for all surveyed land³².

These tenure rights are not specified in the final national Land s Policy approved in 2021. Land is also held by the government in the public interest, including land that is held for conservation purposes.

However, conservation land is a confusing category, as much of the land designated as conservation and forest areas are located on customary land. 

In total, almost 40% of the country is under one form of conservation management, such as forest, national park, or game management areas. The distinctions between different conservation areas, including national, local and special reserves are not always clear. Game management areas fall under the administration of customary leaders, who allocate land and have authority to manage wildlife in cases where there is a signed general management plan. 

^{Customary land is administered by Chiefs. Photo by CIFOR (CC-BY-NC-ND 2.0 license)}

Community land rights

Customary land is legally held in trust by the President through the traditional authorities and Zambia’s 288 chiefs on behalf of the people³³. Rights to customary land may vary according to prevailing customary practices and the norms associated with either patrilineal or matrilineal inheritance systems³⁴, but there are more commonalities than differences. Officially, rights to communal land cannot be bought or sold, although as discussed above active informal land markets exist. 

Successive Zambian governments have argued that there are significant amounts of underutilised land in the communal areas, which if converted to statutory leasehold tenure could attract investment and create employment opportunities and other economic benefits for the country as a whole. 

Any conversion of land from customary to state property rights must be endorsed by a letter of approval from the chief to the District Council. Once approved by the District Council the application passes to the Ministry of Land, which if consent is given issues a title in the form of a 99-year lease with the state³⁵.

However importantly, there are limits imposed on the size of land holding which chiefs may transfer. Alienation of customary land above 250 ha requires District council approval, while deals involving 1000 ha or more must further be authorised by the Lands Commissioner, while alienation of portions in excess of 5000 ha require presidential approval³⁶.

^{Land registration in Chipata District. Photo by USAID, all rights reserved.}

There are two routes to formalising land rights – one through the documentation of customary land rights in the customary areas and the other through titling on historical state land and land more recently converted post 1995. 

Currently there are donor supported programmes to promote the documentation of customary land rights, which provides protection against arbitrary processes of land conversion. Despite these intentions some researchers assert that the issue of ‘traditional landholding certificates’ have reinforced “existing processes of land commodification by increasing the power of the chiefs to  regulate access to land and, at the same time, giving senior members of the lineages increased control over the productive resources within a family”³⁷.

With regard to title, a 2019 World Bank study “less than 10% of households have title, 13% an informal document or incomplete title, and 55% of those without title want to acquire it and are willing to pay”³⁸. At the same time the study found that 45% of people who do not have title “have no interest in formal documents”. This “suggests that customary land management arrangements meet the needs of the majority and exhibit a flexibility unmatched by the formal deeds Registry system”³⁹. 

Overall, it has been argued that converting customary land into leasehold tenure is likely to “create serious challenges for most residents in the local communities…(and)…in the long-term, access to land for the poor in these communities will become more constrained”⁴⁰. However as can be seen from the highly differentiated spatial distribution of customary land sales, this issue is not uniformly significant across the country as a whole.

Land use trends

While Zambia has officially adopted community based natural resource management principles, according to one assessment “community members have remained on the periphery of environment and natural resources management, resulting in top-down approaches to environmental management programmes and strategies”⁴¹. However in recent years progress has been made to improve community engagement in forest and woodland management.

Zambia is one of the most forested countries in Africa with approximately 67% of its land surface covered by miombo woodlands⁴². Deforestation and forest degradation have been identified as a major environmental challenge. Around one tenth of the country has been set aside as forest reserve or protected forest areas, and in total 2/5 of the country has some form of protected status. An Integrated Land Use Assessment report for the period 2000-2014 estimates the official annual deforestation rate for Zambia at approximately 276,021 hectares per annum⁴³. There are some concerns that this estimate is on the high side. In terms of comparative deforestation rates only, Zambia has been identified as one of the top 10 highest greenhouse gas-emitting countries⁴⁴.

In 2018 provision was made for Community Forest Management Regulations to be gazetted to regulate the many community forest management groups established in the last few years, and to specify their user rights in the community forest area⁴⁵. However the forest sector receives limited state support. The annual budgetary allocation for sustainable forest resources management and environment has averaged about 0.68 percent of the annual budget between 2009 and 2020, despite this being identified as high priority area⁴⁶.

There is strong evidence of illegal logging, particularly of highly valuable rosewood trees, known in Zambia as ‘mukula’, which are exported to China. Researchers estimate that “recent mukula production in Zambia could have amounted to about 110,000 m3 per annum, with revenue losses of about USD 3.2 million and bribes paid to state officials of about USD 1.7 million”⁴⁷. A 2019 investigation reported that the state-owned Zambia Forestry and Forest Industries Corporation Limited (ZAFFICO) was used as the vehicle to enable an elite cartel which involved figures at the highest levels of the Zambian government to illegally export mukula, despite a ban being in place⁴⁸.

^{Miombo woodlands. Photo by CIFOR (CC-BY-NC-ND)}

With respect to protected areas Zambia has some 20 national parks covering 65,000 km² and 36 game management areas covering 167,000 km² which combined cover 40% of the country⁴⁹. These areas are reported to be under pressure due to a range of factors including the impacts of wildlife on farming activities and the inadequate benefits flows to rural communities within game management areas. People in these areas are reported to be 30% poorer than the national rural average and 70% poorer than the urban average⁵⁰. 

^{Map of Zambian National Parks}

Like most countries in Southern Africa Zambia’s vulnerability to climate change is increasing with the mounting incidence of extreme weather events, oscillating between droughts and floods. These threaten food security and put agricultural livelihoods at risk.

Land investments and acquisitions

Different government administrations in Zambia have adopted very different positions with regard to facilitating foreign investment in land.

In 1975 the Zambian government introduced the ‘no value principle’ which held that land without improvements had no value⁵¹. Between 1964-1995, just 6% of Zambian land was tradable – the remainder was administered by traditional chiefs and could not be sold or exchanged⁵².

When the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) government came to power in 1991, it set out to create a ‘vibrant land market’ and announced an ambitious liberalisation programme, including the privatisation of state-owned enterprise, and the rights to customary land.

In 2002 the government launched the Farm Block Development (FBD) programme to acquire banks of land to facilitate investor access to agricultural land⁵³. It set out to establish one farm block in each province⁵⁴. In addition the government has also acquired land to establish domestic resettlement and agricultural schemes. 

With respect to the FBD scheme, the government was reported to have acquired some 892,000 ha across its 9 provinces, with each farm block ranging between 45,000 to 147,750 ha⁵⁵.  While land has been acquired, actual farm block development has been slow and few of the blocks have been developed. According to the planning blueprint, each block would comprise an anchor estate of about 10,000 ha, a number of commercial estates of between 2000 and 4000 ha, and several hundred satellite farms of 20 to 1000 ha each. 

The FBD scheme was found to be the largest among the 353 projects larger than 2000 ha identified across 32 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. It has been estimated that some 9,000 people had been displaced⁵⁶. This displacement has often meant that people have been allocated land of inferior quality, with reduced access to water, health and education facilities⁵⁷. 

For land to be productive investors have to have access to water. Diversion of water for large-scale agricultural projects has had major impacts on local communities. Technically, investors are required to apply for water permits in terms of the Water Act of 1996. However, implementation of this Act is reported to have been poor, with inadequate monitoring of water abstraction⁵⁸.

Following the promulgation of the 1995 Land Act, private investors seeking to acquire customary land could negotiate with the Zambian Department of Agriculture and engage locally with chiefs. Legally the chief is obliged to ensure that land targeted by the investor does not undermine existing land and use rights. This must be established through consultation with the community. Once an agreement has been struck:

The land has to be surveyed; survey documents have to be sent to the district council along with a letter of consent from the chief. The district council is supposed to check whether there are any conflicting claims, but this is rarely done⁵⁹.

The Ministry of Lands also has a responsibility to monitor such agreements. However, evidence suggests that these legal obligations are frequently not monitored and enforced in practice⁶⁰.

According to the Land Matrix Data (LMD), between 2003 and 2016, “companies coming from the EU bloc expressed interest in 370,000 ha of land in Zambia to produce crops that include biofuels”⁶¹.

Towards the end of the MMD government’s period in office China approached the Zambian government with a request to plant 2 million hectares of Jatropha curcas for biofuels which initially received a positive response⁶². By 2011 a deal was being finalised between the MMD with the Chinese. However societal resistance was rising to wholesale leasehold of land to foreign investors. This sentiment helped to shape the politics of a general election held later in that year. The incoming Patriotic Front government, which ousted the MMD, put the brakes on the deal and subsequently imposed a ban on the sale of customary land⁶³. The political contestation around the Chinese biofuels land deal indicates how the “processes of land acquisition (are) deeply influenced by the shifting politics and policies”⁶⁴.

Overall, it has been argued that the impetus for large-scale foreign land acquisition in Zambia is a consequence of government policies which enable access to large tracts of land and areas with abundant water in the country⁶⁵. Weak land governance systems and incidences of corruption have raised question marks about certain land transactions. Overall, active state support for large-scale land investments have varied significantly from government to government.

Mining has been described as the “fulcrum” of development in Zambia⁶⁶. There are also attempts to formalise a strong artisanal mining sector⁶⁷. While the Zambian Constitution⁶⁸ protects the right to property, it also allows for the issue of licences for prospecting or mining minerals on customary or leasehold land. Small-scale mining licences receive 10-year renewable licenses and large-scale mining operations can receive a 25-year renewable license. The law requires that mining rights holders obtain consent from traditional leaders on customary land, or any other legal occupier of state land, prior to commencement of actual mining activities. However, this consent may not be unreasonably withheld, and “the failure of a landholder to allow for mineral exploration and extraction justifies the acquisition of the land”⁶⁹. 

In 2017 mining and quarrying contributed 13 percent to GDP and accounted for nearly 70% of foreign earnings⁷⁰. While mining makes a pivotal contribution to the Zambia economy, numerous cases have come before the courts where communities have sought damages for negative environmental impacts⁷¹. 

Women’s land rights

The Constitution prohibits laws that discriminate based on gender, but specifically excludes personal and customary law from this prohibition⁷². An example of particular significance is how the law on intestate succession fails to protect the land rights of widows residing on customary land.

In practice women’s independent access to land remains limited, while the informal systems are reported to reinforce female exclusion⁷³. 

The ambiguity in the interpretation of laws and statutes is viewed as consistently discriminating against women in the arena of customary land claims by allowing those with power to oppress the powerless. Examples include the vulnerability of widows to land dispossession through unequal and inconsistent application of the law⁷⁴.

^{Women crushing stone. Photo by EITI (CC-BY-2.0 license)}

Even in contexts where women can inherit land, power inequalities and deep-seated gender norms may threaten women’s land tenure security. For example, programmes which have sought to document women’s land right are reported to “create resentment and increase conflict not only between spouses, but also within families and communities, often leading to gender-based violence (GBV)”⁷⁵.

While the Intestate Succession Act protects the rights of widows residing on state land, the Zambian Statistics Agency reported in 2019, that almost half (47 percent) of widowed women were dispossessed of their husband’s property, with this figure reaching 59 percent in rural areas.

Urban tenure issues

A 2015 World Bank Living Conditions and Monitoring Survey found that 80 % of Zambian people in rural areas lived in a state of poverty⁷⁶. This has provided a major impetus for urbanisation. Cities in Zambia are increasingly socially stratified, with a widening gap between a prosperous elite and large numbers of households living in shack settlements.

Successive post-independence governments have failed to find sustainable solutions to ensure the provision of decent housing in urban centres⁷⁷. 

^{Lusaka market. Photo by Bengt Flemark (CC-BY-NC-ND 2.0)}

Back in the 1970’s the Housing (Statutory and Improvement) Areas Act (1974) sought to address squatting in urban areas. Certain informal settlements were declared improvement areas and local government issued occupying households with occupancy licences valid for a period of 30 years⁷⁸. In tandem with this effort, the government embarked on developing site and service areas in which layout plans were developed and basic infrastructure was provided. In declared Statutory Areas the residents could be provided with 99-year leases offered by the council.

However, much urban development takes place on customary land surrounding major cities and towns, where traditional leaders allocate land to prospective investors on a piecemeal and unplanned basis. Councils also negotiate with the chiefs to access more land for urban development. This combination has led to uncoordinated urban developments within and around urban centres⁷⁹.

Land governance innovations

In 2013 the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources received support to set up the Zambia Integrated Management Land Information System (ZILMIS). This aimed “to provide secure, transparent and traceable land transactions, with the objective of developing an integrated GIS system that would enable access of information between the Land Register and Cadastral Information”⁸⁰. However, this process continues to encounter significant challenges with respect to data collection and management.

In 2017 Zambia started piloting the National Land Titling Programme with an urban pilot in two residential areas of the capital Lusaka. This programme seeks to enable the systematic titling of former farms or converted/re-planned areas to update the cadastre⁸¹. It was launched under the auspices of the 7th National Development Plan, with the goal of titling 5 million properties in 5 years at a cost of US$250 million⁸². 

The Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources signed an MOU with Medici Land Governance to collect land ownership information for 50,000 land parcels in the city and four million parcels nationally. The fee-based contract requires Medici to make upfront investments in data collection, as they are only paid when a certificate of land title has been handed to the owner⁸³. As of Sept 2021 10,916 certificates of title had been issued, primarily to people living in informal residential areas that have been settled for a long time. However, there are concerns about the costs of the land titling initiative which can be as high as $US 90 per land record⁸⁴. 

There have also been several initiatives to support documentation of rights on customary land initiated by USAID, UN-Habitat and Medeem.  USAID reports that it has supported customary land documentation in Zambia since 2014 and has documented the land rights of some 150,000 people, of whom almost half are women. This involves issue of certificates following participatory mapping and georeferencing of land parcels, using a GIS enabled app on a smart phone or tablet known as Mobile Approaches to Secure Tenure (MAST)⁸⁵.

Documentation of rights on customary land has received a mixed reception from Chiefs, some of whom are concerned about their powers to allocate customary land being undermined. A work around in the form of a ‘Chief’s Certificate’ has been trialled, despite this having no force in law.

Timeline – milestones in land governance

1964 – Zambia obtains independence and recategorizes land into state and customary land.

1975 – The Land (Conversion of Titles) Act vested all land in Zambia in the President.

1980 – The Local Administration Act makes chiefs statutory members of rural councils and requires their consent for any application to lease customary land. 

1993 – National Conference on Land Policy and Legal Reform.

1995 – Establishment of a Lands Tribunal with a mandate to resolve land disputes.

1995 – The Lands Act provides for the recognition of customary land tenure systems, while making provision for the conversion of customary land to private property.

2002 – The government launched the Farm Block Development (FBD) programme to acquire banks of land to facilitate investor access to agricultural land.

2015 – Urban and Regional Planning Act extends planning control to all land in Zambia

2017 – Draft National Land Policy released.

2021 – Final National Land Policy approved and released

Where to go next?

The author's suggestion for further reading

See the reference list below to sample the wide literature on large-scale land acquisitions in Zambia of which the work of Kerstin Nolte (2014) and Chitongwe et al (2017) on the ‘silent privatisation’ processes are insightful; while Schoneveld (2013) critiques the ‘marginal lands narrative’. Additionally, Marie Widengard provides valuable background analysis of land deals in Zambia.

Tembo et al (2018) provide an analytic assessment of Zambia ‘s National Land Titling Programme while Ali et al (2019) explore the evidence from Zambia on how secure land tenure contributes to the attainment of the Global Development Goals.

The work of Lauren Honig on customary institutions, land conversion and titling provides important insights.

References

[1] Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock (2016). Second National Agricultural Policy, Government of Zambia.

[2]Ibid. P.2

[3]Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "British South Africa Company". Encyclopaedia Britannica, 10 Mar. 2018, https://www.britannica.com/topic/British-South-Africa-Company. Accessed 18 March 2022.

[4]Brown, T. (2005). Contestation, confusion and corruption: Market-based land reform in Zambia. Competing Jurisdictions: Settling land claims in Africa, Brill. P.83

[5]Honig, L. and B. P. Mulenga (2015). The status of customary land and the future of smallholder farmers under the current land administration system in Zambia. P.3

[6]Brown, T. (2005). Contestation, confusion and corruption: Market-based land reform in Zambia. Competing Jurisdictions: Settling land claims in Africa, Brill.

[7] Chongo, C. (2015). Decolonising southern Africa: a history of Zambia's role in Zimbabwe's liberation struggl  Vaidyanathan, V. and M. Agarwal (2021). China-Zambia Economic Relations: perspectives from the Agricultural Sector. V. Vaidyanathan. Delhi, Institute of Chinese Studies.

[8] Vaidyanathan, V. and M. Agarwal (2021). China-Zambia Economic Relations: perspectives from the Agricultural Sector. V. Vaidyanathan. Delhi, Institute of Chinese Studies.

[9] de Satgé, R., A. Holloway, D. Mullins, L. Nchabaleng and P. Ward (2002). Learning about livelihoods: Insights from southern Africa. Cape Town, Periperi Publications and Oxfam Publishing. P.330e, 1964-1979. PhD, University of Pretoria.

[10] Mdee, A., A. Ofori, M. Chasukwa and S. Manda (2021). "Neither sustainable nor inclusive: A political economy of agricultural policy and livelihoods in Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia." The Journal of Peasant Studies 48(6): 1260-1283.

[11] Kimenyi, M. S. and N. Moyo. (2011). "The Late Zambian President Fredrick Chiluba: A Legacy of Failed Democratic Transition."   Retrieved 15 March, 2022, from https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-late-zambian-president-fredrick-chiluba-a-legacy-of-failed-democratic-transition/.

[12] de Satgé, R., A. Holloway, D. Mullins, L. Nchabaleng and P. Ward (2002). Learning about livelihoods: Insights from southern Africa. Cape Town, Periperi Publications and Oxfam Publishing. P. 331

[13] Vaidyanathan, V. and M. Agarwal (2021). China-Zambia Economic Relations: perspectives from the Agricultural Sector. V. Vaidyanathan. Delhi, Institute of Chinese Studies.P.17

[14] Mudenda, M. M. (2006). The challenges of customary land tenure in Zambia. Conflicts and Land Administration XXIII FIG Conference. Munich, Germany.

[15] Mbinji, J. (2006). Getting Agreement on Land Tenure Reform: The Case of Zambia. Land Rights for African Development: From Knowledge to Action. E. Mwangi and E. Patrick, CAPRI, UNDP and International Land Coalition.

[16] Honig, L. and B. P. Mulenga (2015). The status of customary land and the future of smallholder farmers under the current land administration system in Zambia. P.4

[17] Ibid. P.6

[18] Sitko, N. and J. Chamberlin (2015). "The anatomy of medium-scale farm growth in Zambia: What are the implications for the future of smallholder agriculture?" Land 4(3): 869-887.P.873

[19] Mushinge, A. (2020). "Mitigating Land Corruption through Computerisation of Statutory Land Governance Activities: Evidence from DRC, Tanzania and Zambia." African Journal on Land Policy and Geospatial Sciences 3(4): 72-81.

[20] Mbinji, J. (2006). Getting Agreement on Land Tenure Reform: The Case of Zambia. Land Rights for African Development: From Knowledge to Action. E. Mwangi and E. Patrick, CAPRI, UNDP and International Land Coalition. P 33

[21] Ibid.

[22] Government of Zambia (2021). National Lands Policy. Department of Lands and Natural Resources.

[23] Land Portal. (2021). "Zambia Launches National Land Policy."   Retrieved 7 April 2022, from https://www.landportal.org/blog-post/2021/06/zambia-launches-national-land-policy.

[24] Tembo, E., J. Minango and M. Sommerville (2018). Zambia’s National Land Titling Programme–Challenges and Opportunities. Annual World Bank Land and Poverty Conference.

[25] Adams, M. (2003). "Land tenure policy and practice in Zambia: issues relating to the development of the agricultural sector." Draft. London, UK: Mokoro. P.5

[26] Brown, T. (2005). Contestation, confusion and corruption: Market-based land reform in Zambia. Competing Jurisdictions: Settling land claims in Africa, Brill.

[27] Chitonge, H., O. Mfune, B. B. Umar, G. M. Kajoba, D. Banda and L. Ntsebeza (2017). "Silent privatisation of customary land in Zambia: opportunities for a few, challenges for many." Social Dynamics 43(1): 82-102.

[28] Honig, L. and B. P. Mulenga (2015). The status of customary land and the future of smallholder farmers under the current land administration system in Zambia. P. v

[29] Tembo, E. and D. Sagashya (2021). "Zambia: Private sector investment in security of land tenure. From piloting using technology to National rollout." African Journal on Land Policy and Geospatial Sciences 5(1): 782-800. P.32

[30] Chitonge, H., O. Mfune, B. B. Umar, G. M. Kajoba, D. Banda and L. Ntsebeza (2017). "Silent privatisation of customary land in Zambia: opportunities for a few, challenges for many." Social Dynamics 43(1): 82-102.

[31] This license was developed specifically by local councils to deal with issues where the Ministry of Lands was not performing its functions. There remains conflict and overlap between occupancy licenses and leases.

[32] Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources (2017). Draft National Land Policy. Lusaka, The Republic of Zambia.

[33] USAID (2017). "Zambia customary land documentation tenure assessment."

[34] Paradza, G., L. Mokwena and W. Musakwa (2020). "Could Mapping Initiatives Catalyze the Interpretation of Customary Land Rights in Ways that Secure Women’s Land Rights?" Land 9(10): 344.

[35] Honig, L. (2017). "Selecting the state or choosing the chief? The political determinants of smallholder land titling." World Development 100: 94-107.

[36] Widengård, M. (2019). "Land deals, and how not all states react the same: Zambia and the Chinese request." Review of African Political Economy 46(162): 615-631.

[37] Green, E. and M. Norberg (2018). "Traditional landholding certificates in Zambia: Preventing or reinforcing commodification and inequality?" Journal of Southern African Studies 44(4): 613-628.

[38] Ali, D. A., K. Deininger, D. H. M. Hilhorst, F. Kakungu and Y. Yi (2019). "Making Secure Land Tenure Count for Global Development Goals and National Policy: Evidence from Zambia." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper(8912).

[39] Ibid. P. 3

[40] Chitonge, H., O. Mfune, B. B. Umar, G. M. Kajoba, D. Banda and L. Ntsebeza (2017). "Silent privatisation of customary land in Zambia: opportunities for a few, challenges for many." Social Dynamics 43(1): 82-102. P. 97

[41] Panos Institute Southern Africa (2017). Deepening community-based natural resource management in Zambia. Policy brief. Lusaka.

[42] Korwin, S. (2016). ANNEX 3 ZAMBIA ASSESSMENT FACTSHEET. REDD+ AND CORRUPTION RISKS FOR AFRICA’S FORESTS, Transparency International: 38-43.

[43] Handavu, F., P. W. Chirwa and S. Syampungani (2019). "Socio-economic factors influencing land-use and land-cover changes in the miombo woodlands of the Copperbelt province in Zambia." Forest policy and economics 100: 75-94.

[44] Korwin, S. (2016). ANNEX 3 ZAMBIA ASSESSMENT FACTSHEET. REDD+ AND CORRUPTION RISKS FOR AFRICA’S FORESTS, Transparency International: 38-43.

[45] Kabisa, M., B. P. Mulenga, H. Ngoma and M. M. Kandulu (2020). The Role of Policy and Institutions in Greening the Charcoal Value Chain in Zambia. P.7

[46] Ibid.

[47] Cerutti, P. O., D. J. Gumbo, K. B. Moombe, G. Schoneveld, R. Nasi, N. Bourland and X. Weng (2018). Mukula (rosewood) trade between China and Zambia, Center for International Forestry Research.

[48] Environmental Investigation Agency (2019). Mukula cartel: How timber trafficking networks plunder Zambian forests. Washington DC.

[49] Lindsey, P., V. Nyirenda, J. Barnes, M. Becker, C. Tambling, A. Taylor and F. Watson (2016). Zambian game management areas: the reasons why they are not functioning as ecologically or economically productive buffer zones and what needs to change for them to fulfil that role. Lusaka, The Wildlife Producers Association of Zambia.

[50] Ibid. P 5-6

[51] Chitonge, H., O. Mfune, B. B. Umar, G. M. Kajoba, D. Banda and L. Ntsebeza (2017). "Silent privatisation of customary land in Zambia: opportunities for a few, challenges for many." Social Dynamics 43(1): 82-102.

[52] Nolte, K. (2014). "Large-scale agricultural investments under poor land governance in Zambia." Land Use Policy 38: 698-706. P.699

[53] Schoneveld, G., L. German and D. Gumbo (2013). Large-scale land acquisitions: exploring the marginal lands narrative in the Chitemene System of Zambia: 109-135.

[54] Chilombo, A., J. A. Fisher and D. van Der Horst (2019). "A conceptual framework for improving the understanding of large scale land acquisitions." Land Use Policy 88: 104184.

[55] Schoneveld, G. C. (2011). "The anatomy of large-scale farmland acquisitions in sub-Saharan Africa." CIFOR Working Paper(85).

[56] Schoneveld, G., L. German and D. Gumbo (2013). Large-scale land acquisitions: exploring the marginal lands narrative in the Chitemene System of Zambia: 109-135. P. 112

[57] Human Rights Watch (2017). Forced to leave: Problems for people in Zambia when company farms take over land. New York.

[58] Mousseau, F. (2022). Drying out African lands: Expansion of large-scale agriculture threatens access to water in Africa. Oakland California, The Oakland Institute.

[59] Nolte, K. (2014). "Large-scale agricultural investments under poor land governance in Zambia." Land Use Policy 38: 698-706. P. 700

[60] Harnish, A., L. Cliggett and T. Scudder (2019). "Rivers and roads: A political ecology of displacement, development, and chronic liminality in Zambia's Gwembe Valley." Economic Anthropology 6(2): 250-263.

[61] Chilombo, A., J. A. Fisher and D. van Der Horst (2019). "A conceptual framework for improving the understanding of large scale land acquisitions." Land Use Policy 88: 104184. P.7

[62] Widengård, M. (2019). "Land deals, and how not all states react the same: Zambia and the Chinese request." Review of African Political Economy 46(162): 615-631.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Augustine, U., O. Chinwe, I. Anthony and W. Ukpere (2016). "Economic and social issues related to foreign land grab and capacity building in Zambian Agricultural economy." Problems and perspectives in management(14, Iss. 4 (contin.)): 236-246.

[66] Mulenga, C. (2019). "Judicial mandate in safeguarding environmental rights from the adverse effects of mining activities in Zambia." Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 22(1).

[67] Hilson, G. (2020). "The ‘Zambia Model’: A blueprint for formalizing artisanal and small-scale mining in sub-Saharan Africa?" Resources Policy 68: 101765.

[68] Constitute Project (2021). Zambia's Constitution of 1991 with Amendments through 2016.

[69] Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources (2017). Draft National Land Policy. Lusaka, The Republic of Zambia.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Mulenga, C. (2019). "Judicial mandate in safeguarding environmental rights from the adverse effects of mining activities in Zambia." Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 22(1).

[72] USAID (2017). "Zambia customary land documentation tenure assessment." P.3

[73] Ali, D. A., K. Deininger, D. H. M. Hilhorst, F. Kakungu and Y. Yi (2019). "Making Secure Land Tenure Count for Global Development Goals and National Policy: Evidence from Zambia." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper(8912). P.3

[74] Paradza, G., L. Mokwena and W. Musakwa (2020). "Could Mapping Initiatives Catalyze the Interpretation of Customary Land Rights in Ways that Secure Women’s Land Rights?" Land 9(10): 344.P.3

[75] USAID. (2020). "Gender-Based Violence and Land Documentation & Administration in Zambia: Emerging Lessons from Implementation." Briefs  Retrieved 5 March, 2022, from https://land-links.org/document/gender-based-violence-and-land-documentation-administration-in-zambia-emerging-lessons-from-implementation/.

[76] Chigudu, A. (2021). "The Changing Institutional and Legislative Planning Framework of Zambia and Zimbabwe: Nuances for Urban Development." Land Use Policy 100: 104941.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Tembo, E., J. Minango and M. Sommerville (2018). Zambia’s National Land Titling Programme–Challenges and Opportunities. Annual World Bank Land and Poverty Conference.

[79] Chigudu, A. (2021). "The Changing Institutional and Legislative Planning Framework of Zambia and Zimbabwe: Nuances for Urban Development." Land Use Policy 100: 104941.

[80] Tembo, E., J. Minango and M. Sommerville (2018). Zambia’s National Land Titling Programme–Challenges and Opportunities. Annual World Bank Land and Poverty Conference.

[81] Tembo, E. and D. Sagashya (2021). "Zambia: Private sector investment in security of land tenure. From piloting using technology to National rollout." African Journal on Land Policy and Geospatial Sciences 5(1): 782-800.

[82] Ibid.

[83]Ibid.

[84] In March 2022 the exchange rate between the US dollar and the Zambian kwacha was 1: 17.76

[85] USAID. (2020). "Gender-Based Violence and Land Documentation & Administration in Zambia: Emerging Lessons from Implementation." Briefs  Retrieved 5 March, 2022, from https://land-links.org/document/gender-based-violence-and-land-documentation-administration-in-zambia-emerging-lessons-from-implementation/.