The bargaining power of men and women crucially shapes the resource allocation decisions households make (Quisumbing and de la Brière 2000). Husbands and wives often use their bargaining power to express different priorities about how resources should be allocated. Understanding these differences and their effects is critical if policymakers are to improve livelihoods. Increasing the bargaining power of one gender group rather than another can mean the difference between policy failure and policy success.

Traditional models of household economic behavior have portrayed households as unified entities. They assume that household members agree about decisions and share resources in the most equitable way possible. More recently, however, economists have come to view households as domains of difference, where multiple decisionmakers may have different preferences and, in many cases, control separate sets of resources. This new approach has greatly improved understanding of household resource allocation behavior.

One in every three preschool-aged children living in developing countries is malnourished. This disturbing yet preventable state of affairs causes untold suffering and, given its wide scale, is a major obstacle to the development process itself. Volumes have been written about the causes of child malnutrition and the actions that can be taken to reduce it— ranging from community-based feeding programs to accelerated economic growth (Smith and Haddad 2000).

"Degradation of natural resources has become a global problem that threatens the livelihood of millions of poor people. Many promising technologies for natural resource management are available to address these problems, but farmers and others often fail to adopt them. Why is this? Although many factors can be identified, lack of secure property rights and collective action deserve greater attention from policy makers and technology developers.

The collective model of the household predicts that bargaining power determines the share of resources allocated to an individual within the household. The concept of bargaining power is elusive, however. It is perhaps useful at this point to outline the possible determinants of bargaining power, while not making any claims to measure power itself.

Most economic research treats the household as a single agent, assuming that individuals within the household share the same preferences or that there is a household “head” who has the final say. This simple framework has proved immensely useful; despite a common misperception, it can explain many differences in well-being or consumption patterns within households.

Economists who analyze household decisionmaking allocation have traditionally assumed that the household acts as a single unit. They assume that there exists one decisionmaker whose preferences form the basis of household welfare and that all household resources are effectively pooled. This approach is known as the “unitary model,” the “common preference model,” or the “joint family utility model,” depending on the study consulted.

This book synthesizes IFPRI's recent work on the role of gender in household decisionmaking in developing countries, provides evidence on how reducing gender gaps can contribute to improved food security, health, and nutrition in developing countries, and gives examples of interventions that actually work to reduce gender disparities. It is an accessible, easy-to-read synthesis of the gender research that IFPRI has undertaken in the 1990s.

La dégradation des ressources naturelles est devenue un problème mondial qui menace les moyens d’existence de millions de pauvres. De nombreuses technologies très prometteuses sont actuellement disponibles, notamment en matière de gestion des ressources naturelles, mais les exploitants agricoles et les autres intervenants hésitent souvent à les employer. Pourquoi? Bien que de nombreux facteurs puissent l’expliquer, l’absence de droits de propriété garantis et l’insuffisance d’actions collectives devrait retenir l’attention des décideurs et des développeurs
de technologie.

Documento presentado en la "Reunión Técnica Internacional sobre Comunidades Indígenas, Tierra, Desarrollo e Institucionalidad.2008" Conclusiones principales: • Necesidad de articular y mantener un vínculo entre las organizaciones de carácter social y político con las organizaciones de carácter económico. • La planificación territorial es menos preponderante en términos de desarrollo, que la constitución y representación de actores sociales, que luego interactúan con las instituciones públicas y privadas.

This LEGEND bulletin takes stock of some of the recent experience in legal empowerment. The result is a kaleidoscope of approaches operating at different levels, but pursuing broadly converging agendas.

It is widely accepted among economists and policy-makers that secure and well-defined land property rights are integral to poverty alleviation and economic prosperity. But how do legal systems, land tenure and economic development really relate to one another? Our author demonstrates the links using her latest research results from 146 countries.