Land deals are frequently agreed in secret between governments and investors. This lack of transparency in the allocation of land fosters an environment where elite capture of natural assets becomes the norm, where human rights are routinely abused with impunity, where environmental destruction is ignored and where investment incentives are stacked against companies willing to adhere to ethical and legal principles.

This paper investigates the real financial consequences of investing in land with disputed tenure rights. It demonstrates that companies which ignore the issue of land tenure expose themselves to substantial, and in some cases extreme, risks. Using case study analysis, the paper connects ground-up financial thinking with empirical reality. In so doing, it makes a strong case for the need to integrate tenure-related risks more comprehensively into our financial architecture.

Northern Burma’s borderlands have undergone dramatic changes in the last two decades. Three main and interconnected developments are simultaneously taking place in Shan State and Kachin State: (1) the increase in opium cultivation in Burma since 2006 after a decade of steady decline; (2) the increase at about the same time in Chinese agricultural investments in northern Burma under China’s opium substitution programme, especially in rubber; and (3) the related increase in dispossession of local communities’ land and livelihoods in Burma’s northern borderlands.

This paper uses household panel data from rural Vietnam to explore the effects of having a relative in a position of political or bureaucratic power. Our results suggest that households increase their investment in land improvements due to such ties. Likely explanations are that connections to office holders strengthen de facto land property rights and access to both credit and transfers. Results also indicate that officials prefer to use informal rather than formal channels of redistribution to relatives.

The author argues that the democratic reform in Myanmar is rooted in profound internal and external factors. Since the beginning of the reform, the changes in Myanmar have taken tolls in a series of China’s existing interests inside the country. Economically, Chinese investments have come under increasing scrutiny, criticism, and even oppositions, threatening the viability of strategic projects such as the oil and gas pipelines. Politically, the initial success of the democratic reform in Myanmar raises questions about Beijing’s continuous resistance to reform.

The series of studies of which this is the overview are a contribution to the third year of this process. The aim of the studies has been to pull together in a simple form, updated information about large-scale land acquisitions in the region, with the aim of identifying trends, common threats, divergences and possible solutions. As well as summarising trends in investment, trade, crop development and land tenure arrangements, the studies focus on the land and forest tenure and human rights challenges.

While there is ample evidence of state and corporate complicity in the serious and systematic human rights violations that have surrounded the development of industrial sugarcane plantations in Cambodia, nobody has been held accountable and those affected have been denied access to an effective remedy at the local and national levels. Unable to obtain redress through Cambodian institutions, affected communities have turned to Europe in search of accountability.

This paper examines the main drivers of resource conflict in Myanmar. The author first looks at the major resource-related projects that could crate conflict in the country, namely the Myitsone hydroelectric dam project, the Letpadaung copper mine and the Shwe oil and gas project. He then explores some of the other areas connected to resource conflict.

Over 72% of land leases involve foreign investors, primarily Chinese, Vietnamese, and Thai companies. Most products from these operations are exported as raw material to the investor countries, leaving little to no room for added value domestically to benefit the Laotian economy. Rubber is the largest single industry within land investment, making up 34% of all land concessions. The two largest rubber investors are Vietnamese corporations, Hoang Anh Gia Lai (HAGL) and Vietnam Rubber Group (VRG).

ABSTRACT ORIGIN UNKNOWN: This report provides a recent update on land policies in the ethnic regions of Burma following the 2010 national elections and the beginning of the ceasefire with the Karen National Union in 2012. The authors argue that, while military conflict and associated abuses have declined, the Burmese government’s commitment to foreign investment and export-led economic growth is making traditional land tenure even less secure than before.

ABSTRACTED FROM THE PREFACE: The origin of this report dates back to 2002, when the first Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey (VARHS) was carried out.

This paper discusses Cambodia’s legal framework relating to Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) and looks at the implementation gaps. It argues that despite Cambodian’s legal framework governing land and ELCs being well-developed, its social benefits, such as protecting the rights of the poor and vulnerable and contributing to transparency and accountability, are almost non-existent.