This article presents a model to help explain the transition path from one water management system to another, typically a commons framework to one of tradable permit‐based property rights. Furthermore, drawing from transaction cost literature, the model demonstrates how this takes place when externalities (the strain on water resources) become severe enough to warrant the increased transaction costs inherent with more complex water rights management frameworks.

When entitlements to access water in fully allocated river and aquifers are specified in a manner that is inconsistent with the ways that water arrives, flows across and flows through land, inefficient investment and water use is the result. Using Australia's Murray Darling Basin as an example, this paper attempts to reveal the adverse economic and water management consequences of entitlement and water sharing regime misspecification in regimes that allow water trading. Markets trade water products as specified.

The Gunnison sage-grouse (GUSG) is an iconic species recently proposed for protection under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). In Colorado's Upper Gunnison River Basin, ranchers own the majority of water rights and productive river bottoms as well as approximately 30% of the most important GUSG habitat. This project used mixed-methods interviews with 41 ranch owners to document how ranchers perceive the proposed ESA listing and how they plan to respond to a listing decision. Results show that ranchers support on-the-ground GUSG conservation but are concerned about listing implications.

Though water rights are at the core of exploiting water resources for irrigation purposes, trivial concerns were offered to the case of Indris irrigation scheme in Toke Kutaye district in West Shewa. The historical background and development of the scheme has been presented in a contentious manner. The augmenting number of competitors too paved the way for conflicts that recurrently erupt out and inevitably lead to a succession of negotiation processes.