Achieving cooperation in natural resource management is always
a challenge when incentives exist for an individual to maximise her short term
benefits at the cost of a group. We study a public good social dilemma in water
infrastructure provision on land reform farms in Namibia. In the context of the
Namibian land reform, arbitrarily mixed groups of livestock farmers have to share
the operation and maintenance of water infrastructure. Typically, water is mainly
used for livestock production, and livestock numbers are subject to high fluctuations

Farm incomes in rural Vietnam are tightly constrained by very small farm sizes. Stringent limits on the area of cropland that individuals may own means that farmers need a well‐functioning rental market to consolidate land parcels, grow their farm enterprises, adopt new technology and increase incomes. This research investigates the efficiency and equity impacts of the rental market in rural Vietnam and attempts to identify transaction costs impeding the market.

This paper uses panel data at commune, household, and plot levels to study the causes and effects of agricultural land fragmentation in rural Viet Nam. We focus on both inter-farm fragmentation (the division of land into many small farms) and intra-farm fragmentation (the division of each farm into many small plots). In both these dimensions, land holdings in Viet Nam are highly fragmented. Results show strong effects of both inter- and intra-farm fragmentation on labour input per hectare in agriculture.

Land redistribution and agricultural collective production were the key components of agrarian reforms implemented by the Vietnamese Communist Party in the south of the country after 1975. Land inequality was serious in the region under the Republic of Vietnam's regime. The new government struggled with agricultural collectivisation contributing to the decline in rice productivity. This study explains the persistence of a market-based agricultural production in the southern economy under the new political regime.