Traditional models of household economic behavior have portrayed households as unified entities. They assume that household members agree about decisions and share resources in the most equitable way possible. More recently, however, economists have come to view households as domains of difference, where multiple decisionmakers may have different preferences and, in many cases, control separate sets of resources. This new approach has greatly improved understanding of household resource allocation behavior.

Much has been written about the importance of gender issues in designing and implementing agricultural evelopment projects (Cloud 1983; Alderman et al. 1994; Quisumbing et al. 1998). Part of this literature has been motivated by the important role that women play in food production, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (Boserup 1970; Dixon 1982; Gladwin and Macmillan 1989), as well as in the management of natural resources (Meinzen-Dick et al. 1997).

Among financial institutions serving poor households around the world, microfinance programs have emerged as important players. These programs typically make small loans—sometimes as small as US$50 to US$100 and sometimes as large as several thousand dollars-to households lacking access to formal-sector banks (see, for example, Lapenu and Zeller 2001). One important achievement of the microfinance movement has been its relative success in deliberately reaching out to poor women living in diverse socioeconomic environments.

The collective model of the household predicts that bargaining power determines the share of resources allocated to an individual within the household. The concept of bargaining power is elusive, however. It is perhaps useful at this point to outline the possible determinants of bargaining power, while not making any claims to measure power itself.

Most economic research treats the household as a single agent, assuming that individuals within the household share the same preferences or that there is a household “head” who has the final say. This simple framework has proved immensely useful; despite a common misperception, it can explain many differences in well-being or consumption patterns within households.

Economists who analyze household decisionmaking allocation have traditionally assumed that the household acts as a single unit. They assume that there exists one decisionmaker whose preferences form the basis of household welfare and that all household resources are effectively pooled. This approach is known as the “unitary model,” the “common preference model,” or the “joint family utility model,” depending on the study consulted.

This book synthesizes IFPRI's recent work on the role of gender in household decisionmaking in developing countries, provides evidence on how reducing gender gaps can contribute to improved food security, health, and nutrition in developing countries, and gives examples of interventions that actually work to reduce gender disparities. It is an accessible, easy-to-read synthesis of the gender research that IFPRI has undertaken in the 1990s.

La situación de América Latina y el Caribe es distinta de la de los países desarrollados. Mientras que estos últimos son los que principalmente generan la externalidad global resultante de las emisiones y también la sufren, la región de América Latina y el Caribe contribuye poco a generarla pero la sufre de manera desproporcionada. Si se toman en cuenta las emisiones regionales, América Latina y el Caribe solo emite más que África, que ocupa el último city (aunque en términos de emisiones per cápita se encuentra por encima de Asia y África).

As the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries (MAFF) aimed to finalize in the end of 2016 the draft law on agricultural lands that is currently in 6th draft, MRLG, together with other partners, has supported the NGO Forum on Cambodia to mobilize representatives of farmer organizations and CSOs so that they could voice their concerns over the draft law directly to MAFF. In close cooperation with MAFF, a 2-day national consultation workshop was held on 19-20 December 2016 in Phnom Penh.

The « Environment and Natural Resources Code of Cambodia » (Sixth Draft – – 20 November 2016) is a very extensive proposed law (535 pages !) which will have, if adopted, major impacts on many aspects of Cambodian development (Mines, Energy, Urban planning, etc..) but is particularly important for the management of Protected Areas and of Forests and Fisheries. The code has been elaborated by a panel of experts and several working groups led by Vishnu Law Group. A public national consultation has been organized by MOE in Dec 2016.

The Environmental Protection Agency shall be the competent authority for the purposes of the Directive on integrated pollution prevention and control here implemented. As competent authority for the purposes of the Directive, the Agency shall, amongst other things, keep itself informed of developments in best available techniques.

This Decree establishes the modalities of performance of local environmental monitoring by legal persons performing economic and other activities causing negative environmental impact, including ecologically hazardous activities. Local environmental monitoring shall be integral part of the National environmental monitoring system. Local environmental monitoring shall include: (a) emissions to the atmospheric air by stationary sources; (b) effluent waste water discharge to surface waterbodies; (c) groundwater in areas of potential pollution; and (d) soil in areas of potential pollution.