ABSTRACTED FROM THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: In accordance to the land confiscation documented in this report, the Burmese military regime has not only constantly violated the domestic laws in Burma like the Nationalisation Act, the Land Acquisition Act and also Customary Law but also international law, such as the UDHR charter, CEDAW, CRC, ICESCR and farming protection rights.

In rural Cambodia the rampant allocation of state land to political elites and foreign investors in the form of ‘‘Economic Land Concessions (ELCs)’’— estimated to cover an area equivalent to more than 50% of the country’s arable land—has been associated with encroachment on farmland, community forests and indigenous territories and has contributed to a rapid increase of rural landlessness. By contrast, less than 7,000 ha of land have been allotted to land-poor and landless farmers under the pilot project for ‘‘Social Land Concessions (SLCs)’’ supported by various donor agencies.

In Rubber Barons, Global Witness documents the devastating impact of Vietnam’s rush for rubber on local communities in Laos and Cambodia. The investigation also shows how international financiers Deutsche Bank and the International Finance Corporation were backing these land grabs – often in contravention of their own policies. In both Laos and Cambodia, national laws are supposed to protect forests, limit the size of foreign land concessions and require consultation with local communities over land use, but these laws are rarely enforced.

With a view to operationalizing the recently adopted Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Forests and Fisheries, this paper identifies gaps in existing World Bank safeguard policies with respect to tenure.

Northern Burma’s borderlands have undergone dramatic changes in the last two decades. Three main and interconnected developments are simultaneously taking place in Shan State and Kachin State: (1) the increase in opium cultivation in Burma since 2006 after a decade of steady decline; (2) the increase at about the same time in Chinese agricultural investments in northern Burma under China’s opium substitution programme, especially in rubber; and (3) the related increase in dispossession of local communities’ land and livelihoods in Burma’s northern borderlands.

Despite the tens of millions of dollars in aid and concessional loans being spent in Cambodia with the ostensible aim of securing land tenure and making the management of land and natural resources more equitable and sustainable, the evidence shows that tenure insecurity, forced evictions and large-scale land grabbing are escalating to alarming levels.

Through LMAP, and subsequent LASSP, Cambodia has made impressive progress in building a functioning cadastral system over the last ten years. This process has proved complex and challenging, but since commencing, the land registration teams have successfully issued over 1.7 million land titles, a strong legal framework has been developed for the functioning of the land administration bodies and mechanism, institutions have been built and strengthened, and a dispute resolution process has been established for dealing with disputes over unregistered land.

Land deals are frequently agreed in secret between governments and investors. This lack of transparency in the allocation of land fosters an environment where elite capture of natural assets becomes the norm, where human rights are routinely abused with impunity, where environmental destruction is ignored and where investment incentives are stacked against companies willing to adhere to ethical and legal principles.

This paper investigates the real financial consequences of investing in land with disputed tenure rights. It demonstrates that companies which ignore the issue of land tenure expose themselves to substantial, and in some cases extreme, risks. Using case study analysis, the paper connects ground-up financial thinking with empirical reality. In so doing, it makes a strong case for the need to integrate tenure-related risks more comprehensively into our financial architecture.

While there is ample evidence of state and corporate complicity in the serious and systematic human rights violations that have surrounded the development of industrial sugarcane plantations in Cambodia, nobody has been held accountable and those affected have been denied access to an effective remedy at the local and national levels. Unable to obtain redress through Cambodian institutions, affected communities have turned to Europe in search of accountability.

This paper examines the main drivers of resource conflict in Myanmar. The author first looks at the major resource-related projects that could crate conflict in the country, namely the Myitsone hydroelectric dam project, the Letpadaung copper mine and the Shwe oil and gas project. He then explores some of the other areas connected to resource conflict.

Over 72% of land leases involve foreign investors, primarily Chinese, Vietnamese, and Thai companies. Most products from these operations are exported as raw material to the investor countries, leaving little to no room for added value domestically to benefit the Laotian economy. Rubber is the largest single industry within land investment, making up 34% of all land concessions. The two largest rubber investors are Vietnamese corporations, Hoang Anh Gia Lai (HAGL) and Vietnam Rubber Group (VRG).