This study tests the hypothesis that an efficient rental market for cropland is a significant determinant of agricultural investment in the communal areas of KwaZulu-Natal. An efficient rental market creates an opportunity cost for under-utilisation, which tends to transfer resources to more effective users. The efficiency of a rental market is compromised by the presence of transaction costs that reduce returns for both lessees and lessors. Transaction costs include risk arising from a possible breach of the rental contract.

Recognition of the potentially deleterious implications of inequality in opportunity originating in a skewed asset distribution has spawned considerable interest in land reforms. However, little attention has been devoted to fact that, in the longer term, the measures used to implement land reforms could negatively affect productivity. Use of state level data on rental restrictions, together with a nationally representative survey from India, suggests that, contrary to original intentions, rental restrictions negatively affect productivity and equity.

Although opinions on impacts of land market transfers are sharply divided, few studies explore the welfare and productivity effects of land markets on a larger scale. This paper uses a large Indian panel spanning almost 20 years, together with a climatic shock (rainfall) indicator, to assess the productivity and equity effects of market-mediated land transfers (sale and purchase) compared with non-market ones (inheritance). The analysis shows that frequent shocks increase land market activity, an effect that is mitigated by the presence of safety nets and banks.

Most markets have evolved as buyers and sellers constantly search for ways to create value, however this has not occurred naturally in all areas of the economy – markets are missing for some goods, including the environment. In such cases, transaction costs linked to property rights, asymmetric and hidden information and packaging problems have often prevented otherwise valuable deals from being negotiated in relation to the environment.

This paper presents an analysis of agricultural contracts using a transaction costs approach. We contend that in a context of modern agriculture, with well defined property rights, agricultural contracts must balance costs and benefits, aligning tenant and landlord incentives towards a similar objective. The study debates the potential effects of tenancy status and duration of contracts, over soil conservation and input use.

The article analyses influences on the design of land rental contracts in Poland. Attention is paid to the effect of both the properties of the transaction as identified in Transaction Cost Economics (asset-specificity, uncertainty, frequency) and the features of the institutional environment (legal as well as customary rules) as studied by the Economics of Property Rights. The conclusion is that institutional influences have a very strong effect and should not be disregarded in the explanation of contract choice.

There is little empirical evidence concerning the effects of intellectual property rights (IPR) on a technologically advanced developing country. Complete enumeration of the Mexican maize breeding industry showed that, contrary to the hypothesis that IPR would provide, in a technologically advanced developing country, incentives for R&D and innovation, IPR play no role for the industry in general, but that they are important for certain breeders' categories. The paper presents the theory on IPR and a short background on the Mexican maize breeding industry.

With land being the main source of income for many people in the developing world, security of access or ownership rights is imperative to the alleviation of rural povety. Past polices of land redistribution, prohibition of land renting and later legalisation of short-term contracts only, may have prevented or undermined tenancy markets in Ethiopia. This paper examines the allocative efficiency of the land rental market in Northern Ethiopia, and the extent to which adjustment in the tenancy market is constrained by transaction costs.

The aim of this paper is to explain in what ways work representation may contribute
to an efficient governance structure. The insights from institutional economic theories
will be applied to two different kinds of employee participation, namely trade unions
and works councils. From the discussion it follows, that the latter may be better
equipped than the former to play an effective role in corporate decision-making,
owing to its specific institutionalisation. The paper concludes with the finding that

Land policies are of fundamental importance to sustainable growth, good governance, and the well-being of, and the economic opportunities open to, both rural and urban dwellers - particularly the poor. To this end, research on land policy, and analysis of interventions related to the subject, have long been of interest to the Bank's Research Department, and other academic, and civil society institutions.