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Library A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers

A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers

A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers

Resource information

Date of publication
March 2012
ISBN / Resource ID
oai:openknowledge.worldbank.org:10986/4882

We present the results of a framed field experiment with Ethiopian farmers that use the mountain rain forest as a common pool resource. Harvesting honey causes damage to the forest, and open access leads to over-harvesting. We test different mechanisms for mitigating excessive harvesting: a collective tax with low and high tax rates, and a tax/subsidy system. We find that the high-tax scheme works best in inducing the desired level of harvesting, while the tax-subsidy scheme may trigger tacit collusion. Via a panel data analysis we further investigate which variables influence the subjects' decisions during the treatments.

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Authors and Publishers

Author(s), editor(s), contributor(s)

Reichhuber, Anke
Camacho, Eva
Requate, Till

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