Somalia - Context and Land Governance

^{Displaced persons Jowar IDP camp, photo by UN Photo/Tobin Jones CC BY-NC-ND 2.0}

Since the early 1990’s Somalia has become synonymous with conflict where land rights, livelihoods and tenure security have been undermined by “the sustained political economy of state collapse”³. It has been argued that a range of social and political actors have come to retain “vested interests in a weakened state”⁴. This has facilitated land and resource capture by militarised powerful elites, thinly disguised by a mix of clan and religious identity politics. 

Land has been at the heart of the Somali crisis since 1990, and almost all the grievance and civil wars can be traced to land grabbing in the 1980's⁵. Political elites are often direct beneficiaries of land grabs, especially those with powerful clan members. As a result, control of land is a contentious matter in Somalia, and places considerable pressure on the political elite to create a balance between defending the rights of Citizens and advancing the interests and clans’ claims on territory. Further still, there is competition over valuable land, pasture, water sources such as well and irrigable farmland, and those residing in cities and towns are disproportionately affected. Moreover, land disputes have exacerbated tensions across several parts of Somalia. 

There also remain numerous unresolved disputes over private property abandoned by fleeing residents and subsequently occupied by members of victorious clans in 1991. Some of these properties have been returned to their original owners following negotiations by elders and, usually, payments, but many remain occupied and form part of clan grievance narratives. There is also contestation related to occupation and ownership claims of state property from the Barre era. Government land and numerous dilapidated buildings were occupied by internally displaced people. The occupiers remain at risk of forced eviction⁶.

The combination of illegal occupation, unlawful possession and squatters have been a source of endemic land disputes which can turn violent. Such disputes often feature multiple claimants and remain difficult to resolve with allegations of biased and corrupt dispute resolution processes, legitimating fraudulent land transactions. In rural settings communal land clashes have been mostly reported in high value irrigated agricultural land along the Shabelle river. Land-based clashes have also been chronic in parts of the Middle Shabelle riverine areas and in Beled Weyne⁷. 

Overall, between 2010 and 2020 there have been more than 11,000 violent incidents reported in Somalia– an average of three per day. According to the fragile states index Somalia is the second most fragile state in the world⁸. 

Despite this the World Bank was recently of the view that Somalia is no longer defined by state collapse and war. The Bank cites relative stability since elections in 2012 and 2017 which has contributed to some improvements in the capacity of the federal government, as evidenced by more effective state response to the devastating regional drought in 2017. However, in April 2021 Somalia faced a constitutional crisis, following a vote by the Lower House of Parliament to unilaterally extend the term of office of President Farmaajo by two years after its expiry in February 2021. This measure has resulted in heightened tensions between federal and regional governments and has sparked divisions among the security forces⁹. At the same time Somalia has been cast as the new frontier for oil and gas exploration¹⁰ which has strong potential to lead to further conflict between contesting elites seeking access to oil revenues.

^{Armed militiaman, photo by Phillippe Royan (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)}

Historical backdrop

Conflict in Somalia has its roots in historical migration and contestation over access to land and water between host communities and migrant incomers. In the 17th century conflict was sparked by Abgaal pastoralists who occupied Mogadishu, displacing the Ajuraan. In the 19th century, immigrating Harti traders found themselves in conflict with local Ogadeni residents. In the 19th century Somali pastoralists migrated from more arid areas of the Horn, occupying the lands with more reliable water sources and quality of grazing in the southern regions¹¹ In an arid environment characterised by long dry seasons, claims by four major clans and related clan substructures to ‘home territories’ which guaranteed access to permanent water sources, pasture and associated natural resources have become central to household identity and livelihood security.

^{Pastoralists cross boundaries in search of water, photo by UNICEF (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)}

Even where people have migrated to the cities, they retain allegiance to their home areas or Deegan, where they retain strong social claims to tenure security¹². However, some scholars caution that an overreliance on ‘the clan lens’ can obscure other factors influencing changing power relations and social structures¹³. They propose approaching the conflict from the perspective of root causes – an argument in which land and elite resource capture feature prominently. However, this statement should not undermine the role clan structures in land conflict and/or dispute resolution. 

Historically there were crucial social and economic distinctions between Somali clans whose livelihoods were either nomadic or settled. “The most fundamental difference between these two groups is how much value each attaches to the land”¹⁴. Long-standing contestation over land and water in the southern and central regions is central to the long history of conflict which has plagued Somalia¹⁵. This continues to underpin power struggles between contemporary political actors. 

As with almost all countries in Africa colonial annexation and competition between colonial powers over territory, fundamentally reshaped social and political geographies. This included the arbitrary delineation of boundaries which cut across the existing social footprints and territorial ranges established by the peoples of the region. This contributed to the perpetuation of territorial conflicts in the years to come. 

The colonial period was marked by the French annexation of Djibouti on the Somali coast in 1860. In 1887 Britain declared Somaliland on the tip of the African continent as a protectorate, while two years later the Italians annexed central Somalia. Each colonial power opted for forms of indirect rule premised on accentuating social differentiation. In 1936 the territories controlled by Italy were amalgamated with Somali speaking parts of Ethiopia to form what became known as Italian East Africa.  The Italian colonial administration promoted the members of the nomadic clans from the Mudug and Majertinia regions as the local elites and set in place an extractive economic system. This elite formation, which was further entrenched in the post-colonial era has been identified as a key driver of the inequalities which would grow in Somali society, escalating competition for access to and control over land and natural resources¹⁶.

Britain and Italy came into conflict during World War II, resulting in the British occupation of Italian Somalia. This was declared a UN trust Territory in 1950, still under Italian administration, before being renamed Somalia and granted internal autonomy in 1956. In 1960 both the former British and Italian parts of Somalia merged to form the independent United Republic of Somalia. In terms of the founding Somali Constitution land was vested in the state, while in rural areas local clan governance structures continued to allocate land for settlement and cultivation. However, there was no consensus on the borders between independent Somalia and neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia – a factor which was to drive up conflict risk in the region. 

Following elections in 1967, the newly elected president was assassinated in 1969 and a military junta under Mohamed Siad Barre took power in Somalia. Barre headed a state revolutionary council which suspended the constitution, banned political parties and declared Somalia to be a socialist state, following a Soviet template. The Somali state pursued a policy of ‘hyper-militarisation’ spending 20.45% of its budget on the military between 1960 and 1990¹⁷.

 Despite state rhetoric about doing away with tribalism, nepotism and corruption, Barre’s authoritarian rule depended on a power base reflecting an “even more polarised clan-based structure than the previous regimes”¹⁸. In 1975 all land was nationalised, customary rights were abolished and land previously under the control of traditional authorities was now to be directly administered by the state. The state set up co-operatives and promoted new collective settlements. However, the state lacked administrative capacity to implement its socialist policies, as clan elders actively contested attempts to centrally administer land. The widening gap between state and non-state land administration systems created space for powerful individuals to appropriate resources. 

Barre remained in power for 22 years. However, his position became ever more precarious following a failed attempt in 1977/78 to annex and incorporate the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, home to many Somalis. This led to a costly war with Ethiopia in which Somali forces were defeated and which resulted in a massive influx of refugees into the Northern territories, aggravating local tensions over access to land and water.  Barre held on to power through a complex politics of divide and rule which ultimately was unable to prevent the collapse of his regime. Conflict in Somalia was further aggravated by cold war politics as Eastern and Western blocs propped up rival elites and flooded the country with weapons¹⁹. 

^{AMISOM peacekeeping forces in Mogadishu, photo by AMISOM (Public Information CC0 1.0)}

By 1991 the central Somali state had collapsed, and predatory elites plunged the country in civil war, precipitating the break-away of different regions. Somaliland declared its independence, to be followed by the northern province of Puntland in 1998. Centralised governance in Somalia morphed into a dynamic patchwork of social allegiances pursuing localised territorial claims which were defended and enlarged by a proliferation of armed militia. The conflict displaced more than 1.5 million people²⁰, created 800,000 refugees, while estimates of the number of people killed range from 450,000 to 1.5 million. 

In the post 9/11 era local conflicts in Somalia became increasingly internationalised, as the country was suspected by the United States as providing a refuge for Al Qaeda. Despite an agreement to establish a transitional federal government (TFG) with international support in 2004, the capital Mogadishu was completely fragmented into no-go zones controlled by warring militia in 2006. In the same year, the country faced a critical drought which impacted on the lives of more than 2 million people. In the context of a war economy many people fell back on clearing woodlands to make and export charcoal.

The negotiations to establish the TFG had avoided discussion of land grabs and their resolution. The issue was deemed to be too sensitive and was deferred²¹. The section which follows on land law provides some insights into the multifaceted nature of land linked conflicts and the difficulty in resolving them.

An Islamist militia group known as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) briefly took control of Mogadishu in 2006 and set about establishing an Islamic state. This was opposed by Ethiopian troops which invaded the country, prompting the declaration of a Jihad against Ethiopia²². Renewed cycles of war and civil conflict in Ethiopia prompted a further exodus of Somalis from the country. Although Ethiopia withdrew its troops in 2009 and the African Union deployed a peacekeeping force, this did not bring an end to the conflict. Al Shabaab – a breakaway from the ICU – deployed suicide bombers, before growing subsequently to be largest anti-government force in Somalia seeking to establish its version of an Islamic state²³. The withdrawal of Ethiopian troops substantially enlarged the territory under al Shabaab control to an area equivalent to the size of Denmark²⁴.

Following successive droughts, famine was declared in the south of the country in 2011. Forces associated with al- Shabaab banned aid agencies from distributing food relief in southern and central Somalia.

^{UN Food relief combats drought in 2017, photo by UN Photo/Tobin Jones (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)}

A Somali federal government (SFG) was established in 2012 with external support. However, the SFG has struggled to establish credibility and tensions have remained high between newly established regional states. At a national scale, the SFG and has battled to counter jihadist forces associated with al-Shabaab, disarm local militia and to recast a new democratic politics, backed by sufficient administrative capacity to transcend the struggles of competing clan units for power and resources²⁵.

The extent of conflict related displacement has created massive challenges for land governance. In 2020 there were over 2,000 sites hosting 2.6 million internally displaced people across Somalia, where people live in overcrowded conditions and lack adequate access to basic services. According to UNHCR approximately 85 percent of these sites are informal settlements which have been established on private land and about 74 percent of them are in urban areas²⁶.

Land legislation and regulations

When the central state collapsed in 1991 an “embryonic land administration system” was emerging which drew on a hybrid mix of religious, customary and outdated statutory laws²⁷.

Three overlapping systems of law impact on land management and governance. The imprint of these systems varied widely, dependent on history, context and setting.

Systems of customary law, (Xeer) have long been used to manage access to common property resources such as grazing, forests and water.   Xeer is an unwritten system of laws which is administered through consultations among elders and focuses on the rights and obligations of one clan to another. Further still, Xeer also addresses numerous aspects of land management with a focus on pastoral land use. Although xeer law can vary based on agreements between clans, xeer law tends to view rangelands as a collective clan asset. However, clans are expected to allow other clans to graze on the land, particularly in times of need. Xeer also contains prohibitions on building enclosures or permanent settlements on pastureland. This law and associated practices are interpreted by local courts, or assemblies of clan elders whose composition and functions vary according to context and social history.

Islamic Shari’a law deals with marriage and inheritance, while also recognising different land categories including land in full ownership (milk), state owned land (miri), endowed land (waqf) and common land (metruke). There are different interpretations of Shari’a law. In its pure form it is said to recognise property rights as one of the five foundational principles of Islamic life, while also promoting a redistributive and egalitarian social agenda²⁸. However, the custodians of custom in Somalia – all male dominated often use custom to interpret the provision of property rights, in effect disenfranchising women. With the rise of the radical jihadist movement, Islamic law has been distorted to justify the extreme use of political violence in areas under the control of Al Shabaab.

Since the collapse of the central government in 1991, Somalia’s formal federal legal system has largely ceased to function, although the northern regions promulgate and enforce some formal laws. The federal government has undertaken some policy review but there are several limitations. For example, the provisional federal constitution, approved in 2012, was meant to provide a framework for a new legal regime, and provided that for land tenure… “every person has the right to own, use, enjoy, sell, and transfer property” and that property will not be expropriated unreasonably. This is the only binding law on land, there is no formal legislation regarding land at the federal level. The South West State is developing an Urban Land Law, still in draft form. Overall, the legal and policy environment is poor, and the land laws and policies are weak. Additionally, there is limited capacity to implement or enforce decisions.

Sustained conflict has fundamentally distorted existing systems regulating land governance, leading UN agencies to explore the development of so-called “fit for purpose land administration in violent conflict settings”. A recent study by UN-Habitat²⁹ sought to develop a typology of land conflicts in Somalia’s third largest city Kismayo in Jubaland province.

These conflicts transcend more ordinary disputes over land, as they are frequently backed by force of arms. The conflict saw many public buildings, businesses and private homes abandoned in the urban areas. These were subsequently occupied by displaced people who have resisted the efforts of government and property owners to reclaim land and buildings³⁰.

Many substantive barriers have been identified which inhibit the resolution of these conflicts. These include fear of retaliation, a land policy and legislative vacuum and the difficulty of tapping into precedents set by the courts or mediated by traditional institutions, as neither keep written records³¹. In addition, there is an overall lack of capacity (resources, infrastructure, expertise or staff) to resolve land related disputes. This is exacerbated by low literacy levels and lack of awareness on rights, remedies and entitlements in relation to land.

Land tenure classification

Broadly speaking the types of tenure in Somalia includes; 

• Private Customary Tenure
• Private Freehold
• Private Leasehold
• Public or State Land
• Urban Land Tenure  

Land tenure is not uniform across Somalia and a more detailed review would require closer examination of tenure types disaggregated by regions – Somalia (Puntland), Somaliland and the Southern Central Regions.

Tenure systems in different ecological zones are differentially impacted by extreme weather events and climate change. In the early 1970’s Somalia experienced the great drought known as Dhaba Dhere. The drought triggered an enclosure movement to protect vital grazing resources which was accelerated by state policy at the time, which aimed to promote agricultural production through clearing new farms³². This provided a window for powerful individuals to obtain exclusive rights in land, and fence in prime grazing.

^{Access to grazing and water is key for pastoralists, photo by UNICEF (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)}

Historically grazing land, water and other common property resources were regarded as a shared social asset, but in times of political instability and accelerating climate vulnerability, powerful elites have been able to control access to water and pasture and extract rents from others whose survival depends on access to these resources.

Conflict in Somalia has propelled the three main regions – Somaliland, Puntland and South-Central Somalia down different paths. The new Somaliland constitution follows on from the Federal Constitution, stating that land is public property, commonly owned by the nation. It recognises individual property rights and provides protection from unjustified expropriation. 

Property transactions in urban areas are more likely to be regulated by property law and related institutions. UN Habitat is reported to have helped create a database of 60,000 properties to create a tax base for the city of Hargeisa³³. However informality and land occupations remain an issue. In the rural areas customary law is reported to be the most common source for land related dispute resolution. The role it plays in land allocation is less clear.  By 2014 there were reports of externally funded investment in the survey of more than 10,000 dryland and irrigated farms³⁴. 

The situation in the autonomous region of Puntland appears less well documented. UN Habitat has also been providing support to map urban properties to provide data for municipal taxation purposes. In rural areas a mix of customary and Shari’a law prevails where land disputes are concerned.

In south-central Somalia, which has been at the epicentre of conflict, localised informal practices still predominate. Land-linked violence has persisted with reports of militia pushing people with weak social ties to the dominant groupings off their land³⁵. 

Land tenure security varies widely, with the population of south-central Somalia experiencing high levels of conflict linked insecurity. The large numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees has major implications, resulting in complex layers of conflicting and overlapping rights in land which will prove very difficult to disentangle.

Overall tenure security may be increased with legal documentation such as valid contracts proving ownership, rental agreements for private land or property. In certain instances, land tenure is secured through the documentation of tenure arrangements especially for communal land.

Land investments and acquisitions

There have been reported land deals between the Somali Federal Government and a range of different countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Egypt, although details of these transactions remain sketchy. In 2015 it was reported that Somalia had offered nine million hectares to the Egyptian government to develop model farming³⁶. There have also been concerns about the role of the United Arab Emirates in alleged land grabbing deals in the Jubba valley in Southern Somalia. Much of the land in question is reported to be held by local and indigenous Gosha and Shabelle (Bantu) populations, who are said to lack political voice or representation within the current power sharing formula in Somalia³⁷. 

Somalia shares the same geological structure as the oil rich Arabian Peninsula. There has long been interest in prospecting for oil and gas, but persistent civil war and instability since 1991 has prevented this. With the establishment of the federal government there was a renewed focus on the oil industry. Somalia licensed seven exploration blocks in August 2020 and recent reports have presented Somalia as the new oil and gas frontier³⁸.  As much of the potential lies offshore, the oil industry will not directly affect land rights in the short term. However, Somalia will be at renewed risk of conflict as powerful interests compete to control oil revenues. Somaliland which declared independence from Somalia in 1991, did not contribute to the ratification of recent laws governing the emergent petroleum industry.

Women’s land rights

Somalia has long had a very low ranking on the global gender inequality index. While Somali women are recognised to have a range of housing, land and property rights in terms of statutory, customary and Islamic regimes operating in Somalia, a combination of chronic poverty, social upheaval and patriarchal institutions make such rights difficult to realise³⁹.  

^{Land rights of Somali women remain precarious, photo by Frank Keillor (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)}

With regard to inheritance and marital property rights men are reported to argue that customary and Shari’a law are the same, while women counter that when it comes to inheritance and divorce in customary systems, Islamic law’s recognition of women’s inheritance rights are often overlooked⁴⁰. Islamic law is clear that both men and women have the right to inherit from the deceased person⁴¹,  although not necessarily in equal shares.

 Women have limited access to statutory courts, and then only after attempts to resolve matters through customary legal processes have failed three times. In the customary system women require a male relative to speak on their behalf and are not permitted to represent themselves directly.

The constitution of the breakaway Somaliland (which remains politically unrecognised globally) states that all citizens shall enjoy equal rights and obligations before the law and states that “precedence and discrimination on grounds of ethnicity, clan affiliation, birth and residence is prohibited.” While Somaliland is reported to legally acknowledge women’s rights to own, lease and sell land, these rights have still to be realised as customary norms in practice⁴².

Urban tenure issues

Despite the constituting of a federal government, central state control barely extends beyond the perimeter of cities - particularly in Southern Somalia. This has led to the characterisation of Somalia “as a collection of city states…rather than a unified territory”⁴³. 

Some 2.6 million people have been displaced by conflict – the majority migrating to urban areas. Many lack secure rights to the city, inhabiting poorly located camps for internally displaced people on the urban periphery, most of which lie beyond the reach of infrastructure and basic services⁴⁴.   

^{Women and children at Somali IDP camp, photo by UN Photo (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)}

During the civil war between 1988 – 1992 Somali cities were transformed through conflict. Victorious clan-linked militias forced their opponents to abandon land and housing in all the major cities. The urban core of cities like Mogadishu was destroyed as a consequence of artillery shelling. Conflict linked land grabs and widespread looting cascaded through secondary cities. This included the theft of the entire collection of land deeds which were taken out of the country to become the basis of a privately run registry which charged fees to verify titles⁴⁵. 

In large urban centres such as Mogadishu, there are continuing reports of tenure insecurity as evidenced by widespread and forced evictions from government buildings, forced removals from older IDP camps on well located land and displacement by private landlords. In 2020 it was reported that 171,266 individuals were displaced by forceful evictions⁴⁶.  This wave of evictions . Has been driven by a spike in land prices which reflects recent improvements in security conditions, and which has prompted the return of Somalis from the diaspora. 

Evictions also have a gender dimension. According to one report “women-headed households in rental accommodation are at greater risk of eviction by landlords, as they are viewed as easier targets than households where adult men are present”⁴⁷.  Urban property disputes continue to be identified as a “major source of violence and communal tension”⁴⁸.  In consequence the Somali cities of Mogadishu, Merka and Kismayo have been ranked as the three most fragile cities in the world. Here urban governance is precarious and characterised by hybrid systems with de facto authority fluctuating between multiple contesting non-state actors – all seeking to enlarge claims on pockets of space within the urban landscape.

Community land rights issues

Land grabbing in Somalia has a long history. This began with Italian colonial occupation, continuing under the Siad Barre regime with the alienation of community owned land and its incorporation into state owned enterprises and followed by the contemporary forced seizure by rival militias. Recent reports highlight tensions over land as wealthy individuals return from the diaspora⁴⁹. 

The complex history of conflict and the different ways it has impacted on land rights has resulted in “tens of thousands of land disputes”. There are court and committee mechanisms for the resolution of land disputes, but many Somalis are reported to lack faith in these, as they are perceived to be influenced by powerful interests. According to one source, Islamic militant organisations like Al Shabaab have “far and away the greatest advantage”⁵⁰ in dealing with the land issue, as Shari’a land law is popularly regarded as more protective of land and property rights than state institutions. Community negotiation and dispute resolution meetings, where the elders gather under the Qudhac acacia tree are preferred by many as a more trusted mechanism for resolving conflicts over land⁵¹. Such approaches may also be incorporated as part of the local administration of Shari’a law. 

Somalia is extremely vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. More than a million people were displaced by a combination of drought, floods and related conflicts in 2020. In 2021 Somalia is currently once again in the grip of severe drought, and this is likely to be the driving force contributing to displacement in 2021. The increasing severity of the climate emergency and the oscillation between drought and floods linked to extreme weather events are likely to trigger intense struggles for resource in the future.

Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible Tenure (VGGT)

In 2017 FAO launched a VGGT-related project entitled “Rebuilding confidence on land issues in Somalia”. This gathered information on climate, land use, landforms, land cover, soil analysis and land degradation processes. The project supported the establishment of a Land Coordination Forum in Hargeisa which was set up in accordance with VGGT principles, together with an Inter-Ministerial Land Policy Review Commission, established in Somaliland and an initial draft policy was prepared following consultation.

Timeline - milestones in land governance

1887     Britain claimed a protectorate over Somaliland

1889    Italy established a protectorate in Central Somalia

1936    Italian Somaliland combined with Somali speaking parts of Ethiopia to form part of Italian East Africa

1941    British occupied Italian Somalia

1960    British and Italian parts of Somalia became independent and merged to form the United Republic of Somalia. 

1969    Assassination of Somalia President prompted a military takeover under Siad Barre

1970    Somalia declared a socialist republic

1975    All land in Somalia was nationalised. Land was consolidated into state farms as Somalia attempted to implement socialist industrial agriculture model 

1977/1978    War with Ethiopia over the Ogaden home to Somali speaking pastoralists ended in Somalia’s defeat

1978 - 1991    Barre held on to power through a strategy of divide and rule which set the stage for subsequent conflict in Somalia

1991    Barre regime collapsed and Somalia was plunged into civil war.
Somaliland declared independence

2000    A Transitional national assembly formed with an interim president

2004    Transitional Federal Government established

2006    The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) seized control of Mogadishu and Jowhar

2007    Ethiopian troops intervened in support of TFG to overthrow Islamic Courts

2008    Al Shabaab – a breakaway from the ICU attempted to establish an Islamic state and grew to be largest anti-government force in Somalia extending its activities into Kenya and Uganda

2009    Somali cabinet voted to introduce Islamic law

2012    A Somali Federal Government (SFG) established with external support.

2017    Famine affected 20 million people across Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan, and north-east Nigeria. Ongoing conflict in parts of the country

2020    Over 2,000 sites host 2.6 m internally displaced people across Somalia.
With the outbreak of Covid-19 an evictions moratorium was proposed as nationwide policy but was unevenly implemented
Somalia poised to become new frontier for oil and gas exploration.

2021    Constitutional crisis as President’s term of office unilaterally extended by two years

Where to go next?

The author's suggestion for further reading

It remains extremely difficult to reliably interpret the significance of contemporary Somali politics for land rights and tenure security. The complexity, deep-rooted and highly dynamic nature of the multi-actor ongoing conflicts in Somalia means that there are many specialist studies, but few general and reliable overviews.  

The Guardian Research Department, the BBC, and the UN all provide chronologies of events in Somalia, but these remain difficult to interpret without a reasonable baseline of background knowledge.

Lee Cassanelli has written widely on Somalia. Her paper Hosts and Guests: A historical interpretation of land conflicts in southern and central Somalia provided a valuable resource. 

Ken Menkhaus is a prolific researcher on Somalia.

The Norwegian Refugee Council has provided valuable analysis of housing, land and property rights for Somalia's displaced women, while Siraj Sait and Hilary Lim provide insights into land, law and Islam and the role of Shari’a law in protecting property and inheritance rights. See the reference list below and the Land Portal repository for more resources.

References***

[1] World Population Review. (2021). "Somalia Population 2021 (Live)."   Retrieved 22 October, 2021, from https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/somalia-population.

[2] World Bank. (2020). "Land area (sq. km) - Somalia."   Retrieved 20 October, 2021, from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.TOTL.K2?locations=SO.

[3] Menkhaus, K. (2003). "State collapse in Somalia: Second thoughts." Review of African political economy 30(97): 405-422.  

[4] Ibid.

[5] Cassanelli, L. V. and C. Basteman (2004). The struggle for land in Southern Somalia. The war behind the war, Westview Press; Haan.

[6] Norwegian Refugee Council. (2021). "Somalia Evictions Portal." Retrieved 20 October, 2021, from https://evictions.nrcsystems.net/index.php.

[7] Menkhaus, K. (2018). "Elite bargains and political deals project: Somalia case study." DFID Stabilisation Unit.

[8] World Bank (2021). Somalia urbanisation review: fostering cities as anchors of development. Open knowledge repository, World Bank Group.

[9] Maruf, H. (2021). "Somalia President Calls for African Union Mediation." VoA news: Africa  Retrieved 20 April, 2021, from https://www.voanews.com/africa/somalia-president-calls-african-union-mediation

[10] Whitehouse, D. (2020). Somalia: The dawning of a new era of oil exploration. The Africa Report.

[11] Cassanelli, L. (2015). Hosts and Guests: A historical interpretation of land conflicts in southern and central Somalia. Research Paper No 2. London, Rift Vally Institute.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Tempra, O. and N. Marongwe (2020). Land and conflict in Jubaland. Nairobi, United Nations Human Settlements Programme.

[14] Osman, A. (2007). "Cultural Diversity and the Somali Conflict: Myth or Reality?" African Journal on Conflict Resolution 2.

[15] Cassanelli, L. (2015). Hosts and Guests: A historical interpretation of land conflicts in southern and central Somalia. Research Paper No 2. London, Rift Vally Institute.

[16] Tripodi, P. (1999). "Back to the Horn: Italian Administration and Somalia's Troubled Independence." The International Journal of African Historical Studies 32(2/3): 359-380.

[17] Osman, A. (2007). "Cultural Diversity and the Somali Conflict: Myth or Reality?" African Journal on Conflict Resolution 2.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Issa-Salwe, A. M. (1996). The collapse of the Somali state: the impact of the colonial legacy. Indiana University, HAAN Publishing.

[20] Healy, S. and M. Bradbury (2010). Whose peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali and international peacemaking. Accord International Review of Peace Initiatives. A. Ramsbotham. London, Conciliation Resources.

[21] Menkhaus, K. (2006). "Governance without government in Somalia: Spoilers, state building, and the politics of coping." International security 31(3): 74-106.

[22] Guardian Research Department. (2012). "Somalia: a history of events from 1950 to the present - in pictures."   Retrieved 23 March, 2021, from https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/gallery/2012/feb/23/somalia-history-events-in-pictures.

[23] CISAC. (2019). "Mapping Militant Organizations. Al Shabaab. ."   Retrieved 16 April, 2021, from https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/al-shabaab#text_block_18781.

[24] Hansen, S., Jarle. (2013). "Al Shabaab in Somalia." Africa Summary  Retrieved 19 April, 2021, from https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/120613summary.pdf.

[25] Belay, T. (2019). Somalia conflict insight. Peace and security report Volume 1. Addis Ababa, Institute for Peace and Security Studies Addis Ababa University.

[26] UNHCR. (2020). "CCCM COVID-19 Contingency Plan."   Retrieved 15 April, 2021, from https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/75050.

[27] Augustinus, C. and O. Tempra (2021). "Fit-for-Purpose Land Administration in Violent Conflict Settings." Land 10(139).

[28] Sait, S. and H. Lim (2006). Land, Law and Islam: Property and Human Rights in the Muslim World. London, New York, UN-Habitat and Zed Press.

[29] Tempra, O. and N. Marongwe (2020). Land and conflict in Jubaland. Nairobi, United Nations Human Settlements Programme.

[30] Burman, J., A. Bowden and A. Gole (2014). Land Tenure in Somalia: A Potential Foundation for Security and Prosperity, Shuraako.

[31] Tempra, O. and N. Marongwe (2020). Land and conflict in Jubaland. Nairobi, United Nations Human Settlements Programme.

[32] Behnke, R. (1986). The implications of spontaneous range enclosure for African livestock development policy. Addis Ababa, International Livestock Centre for Africa (ILCA) and African Livestock Policy Analysis Network.

[33 ]Burman, J., A. Bowden and A. Gole (2014). Land Tenure in Somalia: A Potential Foundation for Security and Prosperity, Shuraako.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Muda, A. (2018). "Institutional and Systematic Violence of Land-grabbing to Gosha (Jubba) and Shabelle’s Indigenous Communities of Somalia."  https://abdimuda.net/2018/07/01/institutional-and-systematic-violence-of-land-grabbing-of-gosha-jubba-and-shabelles-indigenous-communities-in-somalia/ 2021.

Ibid.

[37] Ibid

[38] Whitehouse, D. (2020). Somalia: The dawning of a new era of oil exploration. The Africa Report.

[39]  Norwegian Refugee Council (2016). Housing, land and property rights for Somalia's displaced women. Displaced women's rights to housing, land and property.

Ibid.

[40] Ibid

[41] Jawad, H. A. (1998). Islam and Women’s Inheritance. The Rights of Women in Islam: An Authentic Approach. London, Palgrave Macmillan UK: 61-70.

[42] Tungaraza, M., B (2010). Women's human rights in the Somaliland, NAGAAD.

[43]  World Bank (2021). Somalia urbanisation review: fostering cities as anchors of development. Open knowledge repository, World Bank Group.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Norwegian Refugee Council. (2021). "Somalia Evictions Portal."   Retrieved 20 October, 2021, from https://evictions.nrcsystems.net/index.php.

[47]  Norwegian Refugee Council (2016). Housing, land and property rights for Somalia's displaced women. Displaced women's rights to housing, land and property. 

[48]  World Bank (2021). Somalia urbanisation review: fostering cities as anchors of development. Open knowledge repository, World Bank Group.

[49] Sperber, A. (2017). "Back to the land: Friction as Somali exiles return home."   Retrieved 19 April, 2021, from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-landrights-diaspora-idUSKBN1CH1YK.

[50] Menkhaus in Sperber, 2017

[51] Warsame. (2015). "Somalis need to learn lessons from the legacy of land grabbing in Africa."   Retrieved 20 April, 2021, from https://www.farmlandgrab.org/post/view/24569-somalis-need-to-learn-lessons-from-the-legacy-of-land-grabbing-in-africa.