ABSTRACT Urban land in Zimbabwe is a lucrative economic and thus political asset. Increased demand for urban land across the country has been driven by multiple factors including high rates of urbanization, increased rural-urban migration, urban population growth and serious challenges in housing provision post-independence. This paper uses desk research to map out the actors and contestations over land.

In 2015, 193 countries affirmed their commitment to the 17 goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including Germany. According to an estimate by the United Nations in 2018, the international community loses 5% of global gross domestic product through corruption. Effective measures to combat corruption are therefore a prerequisite for achieving the ambitious goals of the 2030 Agenda. 

This study was on mitigating land corruption through computerisation of land governance activities that include land use planning, cadastral surveying, servicing of land, land allocation, land registration and titling and land development. Using evidence from Lubumbashi (Democratic Republic of the Congo), Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and Kitwe (Zambia), the study used both primary and secondary data to conclude that despite computerisation of land governance activities in Tanzania and Zambia, corruption still persists.

The following are the major steps that were used before in allocating residential stands in Harare. However, these have been changed to accommodate the interests of the policymakers and senior council management. These new changes have opened the system to manipulation of town planning regulations. The Harare Residents’ Trust (HRT) is sharing these steps in the public interest. Several residents have lost their money through corruption involving officials, Councillors, land barons and real estate agencies who sometimes pocket money that they do not deserve.

The establishment and development of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC) are a central part of the Thai government’s strategy to expand infrastructure and attract foreign investment. These areas have been designated for development pursuant to special legal and regulatory frameworks. SEZs can play a useful role in a country’s economic development strategy. However, in many instances, their establishment results in the dilution of legal protections for human rights and the environment.

Ulster University and the Uzbek Forum for Human Rights has released the first sector wide study on corporate integrity in Uzbekistan.

The report and associated policy brief focus on the cotton cluster system, a landmark privatisation initiative designed to improve agro-industrial productivity, and address the structural drivers of systematic forced labour in Uzbekistan. State-organised forced labour regimes in Uzbekistan’s cotton sector have attracted significant domestic and international criticism over the past decade.

This report is part of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2020. It covers the period from February 1, 2017 to January 31, 2019. The BTI assesses the transformation toward democracy and a market economy as well as the quality of governance in 137 countries. More on the BTI at https://www.bti-project.org.

Between 2017 and 2019, the quality of democracy in Indonesia continued to slowly but noticeably decline. While President Jokowi was able to de-escalate the conflict between the government and Islamist groups to some extent, he only managed to do so by integrating some Islamist themes and actors into the government structure. This, in turn, moved Indonesia ideologically and politically to the (religious) right. Religious, social and political minorities were the biggest losers of this shift.

Malaysia’s democratic transformation took a historical turn between 2017 and 2019. The opposition coalition, the Pakatan Harapan (Alliance of Hope, PH) won the May 9, 2018, general elections, setting the stage for Mahathir Mohamad, the chairman of the coalition, to become the 7th prime minister of Malaysia (he had previously served as the 4th prime minister). This was the first victory by an opposition coalition after 61 years of rule by the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition led by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO).

ABSTRACTED FROM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

In 2018, the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) managed to designate a future prime minister, Heng Swee Keat. He is likely to take the place of current Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong after the next parliamentary elections, which have to take place at the latest by January 15, 2021. Heng is viewed as a safe choice, who has a long and balanced career in the ruling party. He will face many challenges as the first leader in the post-Lee era, such as increasing political demands, geopolitical changes and economic problems.

The period under review covers 20 months under a coalition government, a constitutional crisis and a few months when the president and the prime minister, leading different political parties, jockeyed for position. There was little political progress under the coalition government. The Office of Missing Persons was set up to investigate extra-legal disappearances and initiated some investigations. Parliament approved legislation to set up the Office of Reparations, but this is yet to be operationalized.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: In July 2017, Democratic Party candidate Khaltmaa Battulga was elected Mongolia’s new president with 50.61% of the vote, defeating his rival Miyegombo Enkhbold from the ruling Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) who received 41.16% of the vote. Importantly, 8.23% of the voters in the second round chose the none-of-the-above option, the so-called blank ballot. Mongolians believe in democracy as a guiding general principle and vision, but they have less trust in the fairness and effectiveness of political institutions.