Skip to main content

page search

Library Contract Duration and the Division of Labor in Agricultural Land Leases

Contract Duration and the Division of Labor in Agricultural Land Leases

Contract Duration and the Division of Labor in Agricultural Land Leases

Resource information

Date of publication
December 2005
Resource Language
ISBN / Resource ID
AGRIS:US2016203205

Short-term contracts provide weak incentives for durable input investment if post-contract asset transfer is difficult. Our model shows that when both agents provide inputs, optimal contract length balances weak incentives of one agent against the other. This perspective broadens the existing contract duration literature, which emphasizes the tradeoff between risk sharing and contract costs. We develop hypotheses and test them based on private grazing contracts from the Southern Great Plains. We find broad support for the implications of our model. For example, landowners provide durable land-specific inputs more often under annual versus multiyear contracts.

Share on RLBI navigator
NO

Authors and Publishers

Author(s), editor(s), contributor(s)

Yoder, Jonathan K.
Hossain, Ishrat
Epplin, Francis M.
Doye, Damona G.

Publisher(s)
Data Provider